A Embaixada / Consulado Geral realiza missões regulares de divulgação consular para trazer seus vários serviços consulares para filipinos residentes em outros estados sob sua jurisdição. O cronograma do Programa de Extensão é publicado na homepage do site Embassys / Consulates General. Renovação do Passaporte As Filipinas instituíram o sistema de passaporte eletrônico (ePassport) para todos os seus cidadãos. O ePassport possui tecnologia de microchip e uma série de outros recursos de segurança garantindo assim que passaportes filipinos são praticamente invioláveis. A emissão de ePassport também está em conformidade com as normas de segurança estabelecidas pela Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (ICAO). O ePassport Philippine tem um circuito integrado (chip) dentro de suas páginas contendo dados que são essenciais para verificar a identidade do titular do passaporte. Estes incluem a informação biográfica pessoal encontrada na página de dados do passaporte, a biometria do titular do passaporte, o número de identificação de chip único e uma assinatura digital para verificar a autenticidade dos dados armazenados no chip. A tecnologia de chip permite que as informações armazenadas em um ePassport sejam lidas por leitores de chip especiais em quase todas as portas internacionais de entrada. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral recebe e processa pedidos de ePassports, que por sua vez é enviado para o Departamento de Relações Exteriores em Manila para impressão e emissão. Aguarde de 8 a 12 semanas para todo o processo até a liberação do passaporte para o candidato. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral aconselha todos os portadores de passaportes filipinos, cujos passaportes expiram dentro dos próximos 6 meses, a renovar os seus passaportes se pretendem viajar dentro do período acima mencionado. Todos os cidadãos filipinos que solicitem passaportes com a Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não precisarão mais submeter fotografias, uma vez que o seu retrato, juntamente com as suas impressões digitais e assinatura, serão recolhidos no local. Isto significa que todos os requerentes de passaporte, independentemente da idade, são doravante obrigados a comparecer pessoalmente. Não há necessidade de uma nomeação como os candidatos são servidos em um walk-in. Formulário de pedido de passaporte devidamente preenchido, dactilografado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul Passaporte mais recente Uma (1) fotocópia de cada uma das páginas de dados do passaporte ou seja, páginas 1-3 para o passaporte marrom ou página 1 para o passaporte verde Fotocópia de qualquer cartão de identificação válido onde o nome do meio esteja completamente escrito, como ID do estado, carteira de motorista, Certidão de Nascimento, Certidão de Casamento ou Certificado Batismal, se o último passaporte do candidato for o marrom. Prova de que o requerente não solicitou a cidadania estrangeira, p. Cartão de residente estrangeiro (green card) Envio de retorno auto-endereçado, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de correio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o Passport for enviado de volta. Taxa de passaporte de 60.00 (não reembolsável), pagável em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por atrasos ou perdas no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. Os requerentes de passaporte com passaportes com guião manual, passaportes prontos para leitura mecânica (MRRP) e passaportes legíveis por máquina (MRP) A partir de 01 de julho de 2016, de acordo com as diretrizes do Departamento de Relações Exteriores, (MRPP) e passaportes legíveis por máquina (MRP), que foram emitidos antes de março de 2010, são obrigados a apresentar o seguinte: Passaporte antigo real Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) - certificado de nascimento, original e fotocópia (As cópias podem ser Ordenado on-line via ecensus. ph) e prova de que o requerente não solicitou a cidadania estrangeira (isto é, cartão verde válido, visto válido, certificado de dupla cidadania, etc.). Substituição do Passaporte Perdido As Filipinas instituíram o sistema de passaporte eletrônico (ePassport) para todos os seus cidadãos. O ePassport possui tecnologia de microchip e uma série de outros recursos de segurança garantindo assim que passaportes filipinos são praticamente invioláveis. A emissão de ePassport também está em conformidade com as normas de segurança estabelecidas pela Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (ICAO). O ePassport Philippine tem um circuito integrado (chip) dentro de suas páginas contendo dados que são essenciais para verificar a identidade do titular do passaporte. Estes incluem a informação biográfica pessoal encontrada na página de dados do passaporte, a biometria do titular do passaporte, o número de identificação de chip único e uma assinatura digital para verificar a autenticidade dos dados armazenados no chip. A tecnologia de chip permite que as informações armazenadas em um ePassport sejam lidas por leitores de chip especiais em quase todas as portas internacionais de entrada. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral recebe e processa pedidos de ePassports, que por sua vez é enviado para o Departamento de Relações Exteriores em Manila para impressão e emissão. Aguarde de 8 a 12 semanas para todo o processo até a liberação do passaporte para o candidato. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral aconselha todos os portadores de passaportes filipinos, cujos passaportes expiram dentro dos próximos 6 meses, a renovar os seus passaportes se pretendem viajar dentro do período acima mencionado. Todos os cidadãos filipinos que solicitem passaportes com a Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não precisarão mais submeter fotografias, uma vez que o seu retrato, juntamente com as suas impressões digitais e assinatura, serão recolhidos no local. Isto significa que todos os requerentes de passaporte, independentemente da idade, são doravante obrigados a comparecer pessoalmente. Não há necessidade de uma nomeação como os candidatos são servidos em um walk-in. Formulário de solicitação de passaporte devidamente preenchido, digitado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul, certificando-se de preencher a parte Declaração de Perda no formulário Fotocópia de um ID do estado, carteira de motorista, residente permanente ou qualquer outra identificação com foto válida Fotocópia do último passaporte filipino que foi perdido Se incapaz de produzir a fotocópia do passaporte filipino o mais atrasado que foi perdido, ou o passaporte perdido não foi emitido pela embaixada / consulado geral onde o candidato está aplicando: Certidão nacional do nascimento de NSO, Para aqueles nascidos 1950 e em diante ou Certidão de Não-Disponibilidade de Registro de Nascimento de NSO, para aqueles nascidos antes de 1950. O candidato pode aplicar-se para Certidão de Nascimento de NSO e Certificação de Não-Disponibilidade de Registro de Nascimento em e-census. ph. Relatório de Casamento (se o casamento foi solenizado no exterior) ou Certificado de Casamento NSO (se o casamento foi solenizado nas Filipinas), para mulheres casadas. O candidato pode solicitar o Certificado de Casamento NSO on-line no e-census. ph. Relatório de Polícia, se o passaporte perdido ainda é válido. Envio de retorno auto-endereçado, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento via Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de correio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o Passport for enviado costas. A taxa de passaporte de 160,00 se o passaporte perdido fosse um Passaporte de leitura mecânica ou ePassport 100,00 se o passaporte perdido fosse um Passaporte de leitura pronta a máquina ou Passaporte de Manual Verde. As taxas (não-reembolsáveis) são pagáveis em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. Um período de espera de 15 dias, além do período de processamento de 8 a 12 semanas, será imposto se o passaporte perdido ainda for válido (não expirado) e se o passaporte não tiver sido emitido pela Embaixada / Consulado Geral Para substituição. Renovação de Passaportes para Menores (abaixo de 18 anos de idade) As Filipinas instituíram o sistema de passaporte eletrônico (ePassport) para todos os seus cidadãos. O ePassport possui tecnologia de microchip e uma série de outros recursos de segurança garantindo assim que passaportes filipinos são praticamente invioláveis. A emissão de ePassport também está em conformidade com as normas de segurança estabelecidas pela Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (ICAO). O ePassport Philippine tem um circuito integrado (chip) dentro de suas páginas contendo dados que são essenciais para verificar a identidade do titular do passaporte. Estes incluem a informação biográfica pessoal encontrada na página de dados do passaporte, a biometria do titular do passaporte, o número de identificação de chip único e uma assinatura digital para verificar a autenticidade dos dados armazenados no chip. A tecnologia de chip permite que as informações armazenadas em um ePassport sejam lidas por leitores de chip especiais em quase todas as portas internacionais de entrada. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral recebe e processa pedidos de ePassports, que por sua vez é enviado para o Departamento de Relações Exteriores em Manila para impressão e emissão. Aguarde de 8 a 12 semanas para todo o processo até a liberação do passaporte para o candidato. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral aconselha todos os portadores de passaportes filipinos, cujos passaportes expiram dentro dos próximos 6 meses, a renovar os seus passaportes se pretendem viajar dentro do período acima mencionado. Todos os cidadãos filipinos que solicitem passaportes com a Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não precisarão mais submeter fotografias, uma vez que o seu retrato, juntamente com as suas impressões digitais e assinatura, serão recolhidos no local. Isto significa que todos os requerentes de passaporte, independentemente da idade, são doravante obrigados a comparecer pessoalmente. Não há necessidade de uma nomeação como os candidatos são servidos em um walk-in. Formulário de solicitação de passaporte devidamente preenchido, digitado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul, certificando-se de que a parcela de Declaração Jurídica de Consentimento para Viajar no formulário é assinada pelos pais menores de idade. Passaporte original mais recente e uma fotocópia da página de dados do passaporte Original será devolvido) Filipinas National Statistics Office (NSO) Certidão de Nascimento, se nasceu nas Filipinas fotocópia do Relatório de Nascimento, se nascido no exterior. O candidato pode aplicar para o certificado de nascimento de NSO em linha em e-census. ph. Prova de que o requerente não solicitou a cidadania estrangeira, p. Cartão de residente estrangeiro (green card) Envio de retorno auto-endereçado, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de envio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o Passport for enviado de volta. Taxa de passaporte de 60.00 (não reembolsável), pagável em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. Novo Passaporte (para menores de idade no estrangeiro, aplicando pela primeira vez) As Filipinas instituíram o sistema de passaporte eletrônico (ePassport) para todos os seus cidadãos. O ePassport possui tecnologia de microchip e uma série de outros recursos de segurança garantindo assim que passaportes filipinos são praticamente invioláveis. A emissão de ePassport também está em conformidade com as normas de segurança estabelecidas pela Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (ICAO). O ePassport Philippine tem um circuito integrado (chip) dentro de suas páginas contendo dados que são essenciais para verificar a identidade do titular do passaporte. Estes incluem a informação biográfica pessoal encontrada na página de dados do passaporte, a biometria do titular do passaporte, o número de identificação de chip único e uma assinatura digital para verificar a autenticidade dos dados armazenados no chip. A tecnologia de chip permite que as informações armazenadas em um ePassport sejam lidas por leitores de chip especiais em quase todas as portas internacionais de entrada. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral recebe e processa pedidos de ePassports, que por sua vez é enviado para o Departamento de Relações Exteriores em Manila para impressão e emissão. Aguarde de 8 a 12 semanas para todo o processo até a liberação do passaporte para o candidato. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral aconselha todos os portadores de passaportes filipinos, cujos passaportes expiram dentro dos próximos 6 meses, a renovar os seus passaportes se pretendem viajar dentro do período acima mencionado. Todos os cidadãos filipinos que solicitem passaportes com a Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não precisarão mais submeter fotografias, uma vez que o seu retrato, juntamente com as suas impressões digitais e assinatura, serão recolhidos no local. Isto significa que todos os requerentes de passaporte, independentemente da idade, são doravante obrigados a comparecer pessoalmente. Não há necessidade de uma nomeação como os candidatos são servidos em um walk-in. Formulário de pedido de passaporte devidamente preenchido, dactilografado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul. Relatório de Nascimento Envio de resposta auto-endereçada, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA ou com envelope postal pré - Courier de escolha, se o Passport for enviado de volta. Taxa de passaporte de 60.00 (não reembolsável), pagável em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. Novo Passaporte (para aqueles que readquiriram a cidadania filipina ou para cidadãos filipinos recém-registrados) As Filipinas instituiu o sistema de passaporte eletrônico (ePassport) para todos os seus cidadãos. O ePassport possui tecnologia de microchip e uma série de outros recursos de segurança garantindo assim que passaportes filipinos são praticamente invioláveis. A emissão de ePassport também está em conformidade com as normas de segurança estabelecidas pela Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (ICAO). O ePassport Philippine tem um circuito integrado (chip) dentro de suas páginas contendo dados que são essenciais para verificar a identidade do titular do passaporte. Estes incluem a informação biográfica pessoal encontrada na página de dados do passaporte, a biometria do titular do passaporte, o número de identificação de chip único e uma assinatura digital para verificar a autenticidade dos dados armazenados no chip. A tecnologia de chip permite que as informações armazenadas em um ePassport sejam lidas por leitores de chip especiais em quase todas as portas internacionais de entrada. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral recebe e processa pedidos de ePassports, que por sua vez é enviado para o Departamento de Relações Exteriores em Manila para impressão e emissão. Aguarde de 8 a 12 semanas para todo o processo até a liberação do passaporte para o candidato. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral aconselha todos os portadores de passaportes filipinos, cujos passaportes expiram dentro dos próximos 6 meses, a renovar os seus passaportes se pretendem viajar dentro do período acima mencionado. Todos os cidadãos filipinos que solicitem passaportes com a Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não precisarão mais submeter fotografias, uma vez que o seu retrato, juntamente com as suas impressões digitais e assinatura, serão recolhidos no local. Isto significa que todos os requerentes de passaporte, independentemente da idade, são doravante obrigados a comparecer pessoalmente. Não há necessidade de uma nomeação como os candidatos são servidos em um walk-in. Formulário de requerimento de passaporte devidamente preenchido, dactilografado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul Original e uma (1) fotocópia do Certificado de Identificação para Cidadania Dupla (original será devolvido) Último passaporte original e uma fotocópia da página de dados do passaporte Ser devolvido) Se não for possível produzir fotocópia do passaporte Filipino mais recente que foi perdido, ou perdido passaporte não foi emitido pela Embaixada / Consulado Geral onde o candidato está aplicando: Nacional Filipino Censo Nacional e Estatísticas Escritório (NSO) Certidão de nascimento, Ou Certificado de Não-Disponibilidade de Registro de Nascimento da NSO, para aqueles nascidos antes de 1950. O candidato pode aplicar para NSO Certidão de Nascimento e Certificação de Não-Disponibilidade de Registro de Nascimento on-line em e-census. ph. Relatório de Nascimento, se nenhum passaporte filipino antigo está disponível, e o requerente nasceu no exterior Relatório de Casamento (se o casamento foi solenizado no exterior) ou Certificado de Casamento NSO (se o casamento foi solenizado nas Filipinas), para mulheres casadas. O candidato pode solicitar o Certificado de Casamento NSO on-line no e-census. ph. Envio de retorno auto-endereçado, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de envio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o Passport for enviado de volta. Taxa de passaporte de 60.00 (não reembolsável), pagável em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. Novo passaporte devido à mudança de nome As Filipinas instituiu o sistema de passaporte eletrônico (ePassport) para todos os seus cidadãos. O ePassport possui tecnologia de microchip e uma série de outros recursos de segurança garantindo assim que passaportes filipinos são praticamente invioláveis. A emissão de ePassport também está em conformidade com as normas de segurança estabelecidas pela Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (ICAO). O ePassport Philippine tem um circuito integrado (chip) dentro de suas páginas contendo dados que são essenciais para verificar a identidade do titular do passaporte. Estes incluem a informação biográfica pessoal encontrada na página de dados do passaporte, a biometria do titular do passaporte, o número de identificação de chip único e uma assinatura digital para verificar a autenticidade dos dados armazenados no chip. A tecnologia de chip permite que as informações armazenadas em um ePassport sejam lidas por leitores de chip especiais em quase todas as portas internacionais de entrada. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral recebe e processa pedidos de ePassports, que por sua vez é enviado para o Departamento de Relações Exteriores em Manila para impressão e emissão. Aguarde de 8 a 12 semanas para todo o processo até a liberação do passaporte para o candidato. A Embaixada / Consulado Geral aconselha todos os portadores de passaportes filipinos, cujos passaportes expiram dentro dos próximos 6 meses, a renovar os seus passaportes se pretendem viajar dentro do período acima mencionado. Todos os cidadãos filipinos que solicitem passaportes com a Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não precisarão mais submeter fotografias, uma vez que o seu retrato, juntamente com as suas impressões digitais e assinatura, serão recolhidos no local. Isto significa que todos os requerentes de passaporte, independentemente da idade, são doravante obrigados a comparecer pessoalmente. Não há necessidade de uma nomeação como os candidatos são servidos em um walk-in. De acordo com as leis filipinas, o nome legal de uma pessoa pode ser alterado através do seguinte: Alteração de nome devido ao casamento Alteração de sobrenome de uma criança legitimada em virtude de um subsequente casamento de pais Alteração de nome devido a adoção Alteração de nome devido ao falecimento do cônjuge Ou anulação do casamento Alteração de nome devido ao divórcio (válido apenas para os filipinos que não agiu como demandante no processo de divórcio, ou seja, o cônjuge filipino não iniciou o processo de divórcio não é válido para casais que eram ambos filipinos no momento da Casamento) Mudança de nome devidamente ordenada pelos tribunais filipinos ou pelo Registo Civil Geral REQUISITOS GERAIS (a apresentar juntamente com outros requisitos específicos para o caso): Formulário de pedido de passaporte devidamente preenchido, dactilografado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul Último passaporte original E uma fotocópia da página de dados do passaporte (o original será devolvido) Comprovante de que o requerente não solicitou a cidadania estrangeira, por exemplo Cartão de estrangeiro residente Envio de resposta auto-endereçada, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de envio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o Passport for enviado de volta. Taxa de passaporte de 60.00 (não reembolsável), pagável em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. EXIGÊNCIAS para mudança de nome devido ao casamento: cópia original certificada pelo NSO e uma (1) fotocópia do certificado de casamento, se o casamento foi solenizado nas Filipinas (original será devolvido). O candidato pode solicitar o Certificado de Casamento NSO on-line no e-census. ph. Original e uma (1) fotocópia da certidão de casamento (o original será devolvido) e devidamente realizado Relatório de Casamento Contratado no exterior formulário (consulte o relatório de requisitos de casamento na Lista de Serviços Consulares), se o casamento foi solenizado no exterior REQUISITOS para a mudança De nome devido à morte do marido, divórcio, casamentos anulados: Certidão de óbito autenticada do marido, ou autenticada ordem judicial de presunção de morte, para os requerentes viúvos NSO Contrato de Casamento, com anotação que reflete a anulação do casamento, para casamentos anulados. O candidato pode solicitar o Certificado de Casamento NSO on-line no e-census. ph. Original e uma (1) fotocópia do Decreto de Divórcio (original a ser devolvido), para os requerentes divorciados (permitido somente nos casos em que o cônjuge filipino não atuou como o requerente não permitido quando ambas as partes eram cidadãos filipinos no momento do casamento) Nota: Se o cônjuge filipino tiver agido como autor e desde então se casou novamente e assumiu o seu segundo ou sucessivo cônjuge sobrenome, a Embaixada / Consulado Geral pode emitir um Certificado de Um e a mesma pessoa, indicando ambos os nomes usados pelo requerente e um Explicação de por que o novo passaporte não pode refletir seu nome de casada atual. REQUISITO para a mudança do nome devido à legitimação em cima do casamento subseqüente dos pais, ou como requisitado por cortes Philippine ou pelo registrador civil Geral: Certidão de nascimento de NSO com a anotação que reflete a mudança do nome devido à legitimação. O candidato pode aplicar para o certificado de nascimento de NSO em linha em e-census. ph. REQUISITO para a mudança de nome devido à adopção NSO Certidão de Nascimento, refletindo o sobrenome adotivo. O candidato pode aplicar para o certificado de nascimento de NSO em linha em e-census. ph. Alterações de nome permitidas pela Lei da República 9048: A Lei da República (AR) 9048 autoriza o registrador civil municipal ou municipal ou o cônsul geral a fazer as seguintes mudanças de nome, sem necessidade de uma ordem judicial: correção de erros de escritório ou tipográficos em qualquer Inscrição nos documentos do registo civil, com excepção das correcções que envolvam a mudança de sexo, idade, nacionalidade e estado civil de uma pessoa mudança de nome de uma pessoa no seu registo civil sob certas razões especificadas nos termos da lei através de processo administrativo Anotação refletindo a mudança de entrada. O candidato pode aplicar para o certificado de nascimento de NSO em linha em e-census. ph. DOCUMENTO DE VIAGEM Um documento de viagem é um documento de certificação ou identificação que contém a descrição e outras circunstâncias pessoais do portador, que é emitido em vez de um passaporte e válido para viagens de ida e para as Filipinas. Um documento de viagem é emitido para um cidadão filipino que está sendo enviado de volta para as Filipinas ou que precisa viajar para casa urgentemente, mas é incapaz de cumprir plenamente os requisitos para a emissão de um passaporte regular, no momento da emergência. Prova de urgência / emergência é necessária. Formulário de pedido de documento de viagem devidamente preenchido, digitado ou impresso de forma legível em tinta preta ou azul, e autenticado se a solicitação for enviada por correio Passaporte Filipino Expirado National Statistics Office (NSO) Certidão de Nascimento, se o passaporte for perdido ou o passaporte expirado for o Marrom. O candidato pode aplicar para o certificado de nascimento de NSO em linha em e-census. ph. Declaração Jurada de Perda, devidamente autenticada por notário público local, se a solicitação for enviada por correio Quatro (4) fotos coloridas, 2 x 2, tomadas dentro de seis meses antes da data do pedido, mostrando uma vista frontal clara do rosto dos candidatos, com fundo branco. Nenhum vestuário sem mangas. Não são aceitas fotografias desfocadas ou de baixa qualidade. Envio de retorno auto-endereçado, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de envio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o Documento de Viagem for enviado de volta. Taxa de processamento de 30,00 (não reembolsável), a pagar em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita a pagar à Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. AUTENTICAÇÃO / RECONHECIMENTO Qualquer documento legal emitido nos EUA deve ser previamente reconhecido ou autenticado (consularizado) pela Embaixada das Filipinas / Consulado Geral para que esse documento tenha validade legal nas Filipinas. Por favor, verifique o Localizador de Consulados ou o link de Consulados para os estados cobertos pela Embaixada / Consulados Gerais nos EUA. Cada documento consularizado terá o selo da Embaixada / Consulado Geral ea assinatura do oficial de autenticação. A Embaixada das Filipinas / Consulado Geral não assume a responsabilidade pelo conteúdo do documento. PROCEDIMENTO E REQUISITOS para documentos privados, tais como procuração especial, procuração geral, declaração jurada, certificação, escritura de doação, escritura de venda, liquidação extrajudicial de imóveis, etc: 1. Carta de cobertura (manuscrita ou digitada) Dirigida à Secção Consular, indicando o serviço / transacção solicitada e os dados de contacto completos (número de telefone, endereço postal, endereço de correio electrónico). 2. Original e uma (1) fotocópia do documento e de todos os anexos. Documento (s) deve (m) ser assinado (s) pelos signatários / declarantes antes de um Funcionário Consular. 3. Original e uma (1) fotocópia de passaporte válido ou documento de identidade emitido pelo governo (o original será devolvido) 4. Se enviado por correio: Os documentos devem ser notarizados por um notário público e assinatura do notário público deve ser autenticado por O Secretário de Estado onde o Notário Público está registrado (para os candidatos vindos de estados da Região Sudeste dos EUA, consulte o diretório abaixo dos oficiais de autenticação dos Secretários de Estado). Diretório dos Escritórios dos Secretários dos Estados nos Estados Unidos Região Sudeste Escritório do Secretário de Estado Para documentos emitidos em territórios dos EUA (fora dos EUA), que estão sob a jurisdição da Embaixada das Filipinas, o documento deve ser autenticado pelo Escritórios governamentais, tais como o Gabinete do Governador, o Gabinete dos Negócios Estrangeiros, etc. (consulte o Localizador de Consulados ou o Link dos Consulados para os territórios sob a jurisdição da Embaixada). 5. Envelope de resposta com endereços próprios, com selos apropriados para correio expresso ou prioritário, com números de rastreamento através do Serviço Postal dos EUA, ou com envelope de envio pré-pago do correio privado de escolha, se o documento for enviado de volta. 6. Taxa de processamento de 25,00 (não reembolsável), pagável em dinheiro ou ordem de pagamento feita a favor da Embaixada das Filipinas (ou Consulado Geral das Filipinas, se a solicitação for feita em um dos Consulados Gerais das Filipinas nos EUA). Cheques pessoais e cartões de crédito não são aceitos. 7. Para os candidatos residentes em territórios dos EUA ou outros países dentro da jurisdição da Embaixada das Filipinas, os candidatos devem anexar tesoureiros, gerentes ou cheque certificado emitido por um banco local que tenha um banco correspondente nos EUA (a US National Bank Association não é Um banco correspondente), pagável ao mensageiro de escolha, em dólares dos EUA, para cobrir o custo do envio de correspondência, e uma correspondente correspondência auto-endereçada etiqueta de endereço. Cheques pessoais não são aceitos. Para os candidatos que preferem usar o Fedex, certifique-se de que o número de conta do candidato / destinatário é indicado na nota aérea como prova de pagamento. Nota: A Embaixada / Consulado Geral das Filipinas não assume qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer atraso ou perda no correio, ou enquanto os documentos estiverem sob custódia do serviço de correio. O requerente deve anotar os números de rastreamento de todos os envelopes utilizados e enviados. PROCEDIMENTO E REQUISITOS para documentos emitidos pelo Governo dos Estados Unidos, tais como Certificado de Nascimento, Certificado de Morte, Certificado de Casamento, Decreto de Divórcio, etc. e aqueles emitidos por instituições privadas, tais como Transcrição de Registros, Registros Médicos, Licenças, Certificados de Treinamento etc. 1. Carta de cobertura (escrita à mão ou dactilografada), dirigida à Secção Consular, indicando o serviço / transacção solicitada e completando os dados de contacto (número de telefone, endereço postal, endereço de correio electrónico). 2. Original e uma (1) fotocópia do documento e todos os anexos emitidos pela agência governamental / instituição privada. 3. O documento deve ser autenticado pelo Secretário de Estado que tem jurisdição sobre a agência governamental emissora ou o local onde a instituição privada está localizada (Por favor consulte o diretório de oficiais de autenticação dos Secretários de Estado). 4. For documents issued in U. S. territories (outside of the U. S.), which are under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, document must be authenticated by the appropriate government offices, such as Office of the Governor, Foreign Affairs Office, etc. (please refer to the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the territories under the jurisdiction of the Embassy). 5. Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if document is to be mailed back. 6. Processing fee of 25.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. 7. For applicants residing in U. S. territories or other countries within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, applicants should enclose a treasurers, managers or certified check issued by a local bank that has a corresponding bank in the U. S. (the US National Bank Association is not a correspondent bank), payable to the courier of choice, in U. S. dollars, to cover cost of mailing, and a corresponding self-addressed couriers address label. Personal checks are not accepted. For applicants who prefer to use Fedex, please make sure that the account number of the applicant/recipient is indicated in the airway bill as proof of payment. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. PROCEDURE AND REQUIREMENTS for business-related documents, such as Trademark, Patent Application, Oath of Corporate Secretaries/Offices, Appointment of Resident Agent, Affidavit of Use/Non-Use, Assignment of Letters of Patent, etc. 1. Covering letter (handwritten or typed), addressed to the Consular Section, indicating service/transaction requested and complete contact details (telephone number, postal address, email address). 2. Original and one (1) photocopy of document and all enclosures 3. Document must be authenticated by the Secretary of State which has jurisdiction over the place where the issuing office is located (please refer to the directory of authenticating officers of the Secretaries of States). 4. Document must then be authenticated by the U. S. Department of State. 5. For documents issued in U. S. territories (outside of the U. S.), which are under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, document must be authenticated by the appropriate government offices, such as Office of the Governor, Foreign Affairs Office, etc. (please refer to the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the territories under the jurisdiction of the Embassy). 6. Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if document is to be mailed back. 7. Processing fee of 25.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. 8. For applicants residing in U. S. territories or other countries within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, applicants should enclose a treasurers, managers or certified check issued by a local bank that has a corresponding bank in the U. S. (the US National Bank Association is not a correspondent bank), payable to the courier of choice, in U. S. dollars, to cover cost of mailing, and a corresponding self-addressed couriers address label. Personal checks are not accepted. For applicants who prefer to use Fedex, please make sure that the account number of the applicant/recipient is indicated in the airway bill as proof of payment. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. The Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco allows the direct authentication of U. S. state, county and other official documents (i. e. country or state-issued documents such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, certificates of no police record, court documents, official school transcript of records and other similar documents do not need to be notarized). CIVIL REGISTRY Solemnization of Marriage Consular Officers are authorized to solemnize marriages between two Filipinos of the states under the jurisdiction of the Embassy/Consulate General. Please check the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates General in the U. S. In view of the infrequency of need for this service, applicants for solemnization of marriage are advised to just call the Embassy/Consulate General concerned for the requirements. Report of Marriage between Filipinos or a Filipino and a Foreign National The marriage of a Filipino should be reported to and registered with the Philippine National Statistics Office through the Embassy/Consulate General having jurisdiction over the locality where the event took place. Please check the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates General in the U. S. Four (4) original duly-accomplished Report of Marriage Contracted Abroad form, typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, signed by both husband and wife. Wives should indicate their maiden name as the last name. If submitting by mail, the completed forms must be notarized. Covering letter (handwritten or typed), addressed to the Consular Section, indicating service/transaction requested and telephone number or email address for contact details One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of the Marriage Record (original will be returned) One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of the Marriage Certificate or Contract (original will be returned) Four (4) photocopies of a government-issued identification card or passport of both husband and wife Four (4) photocopies of Philippine birth certificate of Filipino spouse Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Report of Marriage is to be mailed back. Processing fee of 25.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. For applicants residing in U. S. territories or other countries within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, applicants should enclose a treasurers, managers or certified check issued by a local bank that has a corresponding bank in the U. S. (the US National Bank Association is not a correspondent bank), payable to the courier of choice, in U. S. dollars, to cover cost of mailing, and a corresponding self-addressed couriers address label. Personal checks are not accepted. For applicants who prefer to use Fedex, please make sure that the account number of the applicant/recipient is indicated in the airway bill as proof of payment. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. A. IF FILIPINO SPOUSE WAS PREVIOUSLY MARRIED AND DIVORCED, OR PREVIOUSLY MARRIED AND MARRIAGE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNULLED One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of the Judicial Decree of Divorce or Annulment (original will be returned) Note: Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines or Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by E. O. No. 227, promulgated on 27 July 1987) provides that: All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law (underlining and highlighting supplied.) B. IF THE FILIPINO SPOUSE IS A WIDOW / WIDOWER One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of Death Certificate of deceased spouse (original will be returned) C. OTHER REQUIREMENTS The Consular Officer reserves the right to require additional proof or documents from an applicant, to prove his/her citizenship or identity pursuant to the Philippine Passport Law (R. A. 8239) and the Foreign Service Act. (R. A. 7157) Report of Birth of Child Born Abroad of Filipino Parents The birth of a Filipino should be reported to and registered with the Philippine National Statistics Office through the Embassy/Consulate General having jurisdiction over the locality where the event took place. Please check the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates General in the U. S. Four (4) original duly-accomplished Report of Birth application forms, typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, with the portion for witnesses duly-filled out when applying by mail. Forms should be notarized if submitting by mail. For applicants with more than one given name, please indicate all names under Childs First Name and the mothers maiden name for Childs Middle Name. Covering letter (handwritten or typed), addressed to the Consular Section, indicating service/transaction requested and telephone number or email address for contact details One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of Birth Certificate (original will be returned) One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of Marriage Certificate of the parents (original will be returned) Notarized Affidavit of Acknowledgment of the Paternity and Permission to Use Fathers Surname, executed by the father, if parents are not married and the fathers surname is being used by the child One (1) original or certified true copy and four (4) photocopies of proof of Philippine citizenship of either parent at time of birth of the child, such as Philippine passport (original will be returned), and photocopies of alien registration card, for green card holders. If only one parent is a Filipino at the time of childs birth, the non-Filipino parent must submit four (4) photocopies of a government-issued identification card or passport. For parents who are dual citizens, four (4) photocopies of Order of Approval or Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship, indicating the name of the child as a minor-beneficiary of the parents re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship. If applicable, four (4) photocopies of U. S. Naturalization Certificate of parent(s). Notarized affidavit explaining the reasons for delayed registration, if Report of Birth is filed more than a year after the child is born Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Report of Birth is to be mailed back. Processing fee of 25.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. For applicants residing in U. S. territories or other countries within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, applicants should enclose a treasurers, managers or certified check issued by a local bank that has a corresponding bank in the U. S. (the US National Bank Association is not a correspondent bank), payable to the courier of choice, in U. S. dollars, to cover cost of mailing, and a corresponding self-addressed couriers address label. Personal checks are not accepted. For applicants who prefer to use Fedex, please make sure that the account number of the applicant/recipient is indicated in the airway bill as proof of payment. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. The Consular Officer may require additional proof or documents from applicant to determine the childs citizenship, identity, or eligibility for registration of birth under Philippine laws. Report of Death and/or Consular Mortuary Certificate The death of a Filipino should be reported to and registered with the Philippine National Statistics Office through the Embassy/Consulate General having jurisdiction over the locality where the event took place. Please check the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates General in the U. S. Consular. Mortuary Certificates are issued when remains or the cremated remains of a deceased (Filipino or foreigner) are to be transported to the Philippines. One (1) original copy of the duly-accomplished Report of Death application form, typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, signed by the representative (if deceased is a Filipino citizen) . Form should be notarized if submitting by mail. One (1) original copy and (5) photocopies of the Certificate of Death issued by the State Department of Health One (1) original and five (5) photocopies of notarized certificate issued by the Mortuary Director that the body was properly embalmed or cremated, and that the casket contains only the body of the deceased (for human remains only) One (1) original and five (5) photocopies of the Certificate of Cremation issued by the Crematory (for cremated remains only) One (1) original and five (5) photocopies of the Certificate of No Contagious Disease issued by the State Department of Health (for human remains only) One (1) original and five (5) photocopies of the Burial Transit Permit (for human remains only) Six (6) copies of the Itinerary, to include full flight details and mode of transportation Name, address, and contact number of the receiving funeral parlor in the Philippines (for human remains only) Six (6) photocopies of the deceaseds identification card or passport Six (6) photocopies of identification documents (passport, drivers license, etc.) of the person who will travel with the urn (for cremated remains only) Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Consular Mortuary Certificate is to be mailed back. Processing fee in the amount of fifty dollars (50.00), if Filipino, and 25.00 if US citizen. payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. Payments are non-refundable. For applicants residing in U. S. territories or other countries within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Embassy, applicants should enclose a treasurers, managers or certified check issued by a local bank that has a corresponding bank in the U. S. (the US National Bank Association is not a correspondent bank), payable to the courier of choice, in U. S. dollars, to cover cost of mailing, and a corresponding self-addressed couriers address label. Personal checks are not accepted. For applicants who prefer to use Fedex, please make sure that the account number of the applicant/recipient is indicated in the airway bill as proof of payment. If deceased is no longer a Filipino citizen, reduce the number of photocopies by two (2) for requirements 2 - 10. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. DUAL CITIZENSHIP Republic Act 9225 otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (more popularly known as the Dual Citizenship Law) enables former natural-born Filipinos who have become naturalized citizens of another country to reacquire/retain their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a Philippine Consular Officer. Upon reacquiring their Philippine citizenship, they shall enjoy full civil, economic and political rights as Filipinos. Under the principle of derivative citizenship, unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted, of former Filipino parents who reacquired their Philippine citizenship under this law, may also be deemed Filipino citizens, if they are included in the parents application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. However, there is another kind of dual citizenship, which is not covered by the law. This pertains to a dual citizen by birth: A child born in the United States when either parent was still a Filipino citizen is considered to be a dual citizen from birth (if born on or after January 17, 1973) . Dual citizens who wish to apply for a Philippine passport will need to make a separate application and submit the requirements as specified in passport for dual or newly-registered PH citizens link on the left. Application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship Submit the original and one duplicate copy of the following required documents to apply for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship: One (1) original and one (1) photocopy of the duly-accomplished Dual Citizenship application form, typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink Copy of Philippine Birth Certificate (original to be presented before the oath taking, when applying by mail) Copies of Philippine and U. S. Passports (originals to be presented before the oath taking, when applying by mail) Copy of Marriage Certificate/Contract, for married women (original to be presented before the oath taking, when applying by mail) Copy of U. S. Naturalization Certificate (original to be presented before the oath taking, when applying by mail) Four (4) colored photos, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Processing fee of 50.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted . Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS for Derivative Citizenship Ensure that the appropriate portions on page 2 of the Dual Citizenship application form are filled up Duplicate original or certified photocopy of the birth certificate of the children and their non-Philippine passport Three (3) identical colored photos, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Processing fee of 25.00 (non-refundable), per derivative child, payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted . The applicant will be informed of the date for the oath taking before a Consular Officer at the Embassy/Consulate General. Prior to taking his/her oath, the applicant will be required to sign the Oath of Allegiance prepared by the Embassy/Consulate General. The applicant will receive his/her original copy of the notarized oath of allegiance, together with the Order of Approval, Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship and Identification Certificate issued by the Embassy/Consulate General, after the oath has been administered. If the applicant is a Bureau of Immigration registered alien, he shall surrender the original ACR and ICR/CRTV, or in its absence, an affidavit explaining the loss of said documents for transmittal to the BI. Applicants scheduled for oath-taking are requested to come dressed in at least decent casual attire, which does not include sleeveless shirts (for men), tank top, spaghetti strapped or mid-riff blouses (for women), shorts of any kind, and slippers. Rights and privileges Once you reacquire/retain your Philippine citizenship, you will again enjoy full civil, economic and political rights under existing Philippine laws. Among these rights are: The right to travel with a Philippine passport. The right to own real property in the Philippines. The right to engage in business and commerce as a Filipino, and The right to practice ones profession, provided that a license or permit to engage in such practice is obtained from the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), or the Supreme Court in the case of lawyers. You may also vote in Philippine national elections (for President, Vice President, Senators and sectoral representatives) by overseas/absentee ballot in accordance with the provisions of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. You will enjoy all other rights and privileges enjoyed by Filipino citizens. Implication on taxes Under the Comprehensive Tax Reform Program of 1997, incomes earned abroad by Filipinos from 1998 onwards are no longer taxable. Hence, all Filipinos abroad, including those who have reacquired their Philippine citizenship, have been exempted by the Philippine Government from paying Philippine income tax on incomes earned abroad. Incomes earned in the Philippines, however, will be subject to Philippine income tax. Travel Tax exemption is being granted to dual citizens departing the Philippines and returning to the United States whose arrival is stamped on the Philippine passport and whose stay does not exceed one (1) year, the same privilege accorded to Filipino permanent residents abroad . For this purpose, a Travel Tax Exemption Certificate (TIEZA Form 354) is issued upon presentation of both the Philippine and U. S. passports. Processing fee of Php 200.00 is collected for every certificate issued. Those whose arrival is stamped on the U. S. passport need not secure the exemption certificate for they are not covered by the Travel Tax pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1183 as amended. Provided that their immigration status in the Philippines is as temporary visitors and not as permanent resident. Dual citizens whose stay in the Philippines exceed one (1) year will pay the travel tax irrespective of which passport they are using for travel. Residency requirement Residency in the Philippines is NOT a requirement for those who reacquire Philippine citizenship. Visa requirement for foreign spouse and/or children when traveling to the Philippines As long as the foreign spouse and children travel with the Balikbayan . they will be entitled to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year. Note: Documents submitted which are in a foreign language must have an official English translation. Nationals of a number of countries with which the Philippines maintains diplomatic relations, including the United States, may avail themselves of visa-free entry into the Philippines, provided their stay will not exceed 30 days. Please contact the Philippine Embassy/Consulate General for information on which countries are extended this privilege. US citizens who wish to stay more than 30 days in the Philippines and nationals of countries who are not extended the 30-day visa free privilege should apply for a visa before traveling to the Philippines. Returning Balikbayans or former Filipinos may also enter the Philippines without a visa and stay for a period of one (1) year, provided that they have a passport valid for 6 months beyond the intended stay in the Philippines, a roundtrip ticket, and proof of former Philippine citizenship (e. g. old Philippine passport or NSO-authenticated birth certificate). Foreign spouses and their minor children may avail themselves of this privilege if traveling with the Balikbayan . Non-immigrant Visa Of the above, the most frequently-applied for visa at the Embassy are the 9(a) Temporary Visitors Visa, 9(c) Seamans Visa, and the 9(e) Foreign Government Official Visa. For inquiries regarding the other non-immigrant visa types, applicants may call the Embassy/Consulate General concerned. Please check the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates General in the U. S. Applicants may check the Philippine Bureau of Immigration website to check if they need to apply for a visa. 9(A) Temporary Visitors Visa Passport of applicant (valid at least 6 months from return date) Duly-accomplished Non-Immigrant Visa application form. typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, and notarized if sent by mail Travel Itinerary (applicant must be a holder of a roundtrip/onward flight ticket out of Manila) One (1) colored photo, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Proof of Financial Capacity (photocopy of latest bank statement and an employment certificate from the employer indicating position and salary, or affidavit of support), for Tourist Visa (for pleasure only). Letter from employer or sponsor of the trip, indicating its specific purpose or nature and length of stay (inclusive dates) in the Philippines, for Tourist Visa (for business only). For minor visa applicants (below 18) traveling on their own, affidavit of support and guarantee from either parent, as well as photocopy of parents bank statement. Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Passport with Visa is to be mailed back. Visa fee, according to fee schedule below (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. For nationals of countries with visa agreement with the Philippines: Single entry valid for three (3) months US 30.00 Multiple entry valid for six (6) months US 60.00 Multiple-entry valid for twelve (12) months US 90.00 For nationals of countries without visa agreement with the Philippines: Single entry valid for three (3) months US 40.00 Multiple entry valid for six (6) months US 80.00 Multiple-entry valid for twelve (12) months US 120.00 Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. Waiver of Exclusion Ground (WEG) for Certain Minors As a rule, minors, who are under 15 years of age and unaccompanied by or not traveling with a parent to the Philippines, are generally excluded from entering the Philippine ports of entry. To avoid exclusion before arrival at Philippine ports, the minors parent/s or guardian needs to submit an Affidavit of Request, Consent and Guarantee for the Issuance of Waiver of Exclusion Ground, duly-authenticated/acknowledged by the Embassy/Consulate General, to the Bureau of Immigration authorities at the port of entry and pay the waiver fee of P3,120.00 for each unaccompanied minor. To have the Affidavit of Request, Consent and Guarantee duly-authenticated/acknowledged by the Embassy/Consulate General, please refer to the procedures and requirements for private documents under the Authentication/Acknowledgment link. In addition to the requirements enumerated, please include a copy of the Report of Birth of child, if born abroad, or a copy of the NSO Birth Certificate, if born in the Philippines, or a copy of the Birth Certificate issued by the Department of Health or the Office of Vital Statistics, if born in the U. S. (originals to be presented), as well as a photocopy of the data page of the passport of the child. For US citizens and citizens of countries with 30-day visa free privileges who intend to stay longer than 30 days, please see requirements for 9(A) Temporary Visitors Visa. Except for 6, all visa requirements apply. Proof of financial capacity will be the burden of the parent/s or guardian and not the child. Passport of applicant (valid at least 6 months from return date) Duly-accomplished Non-Immigrant Visa application form. typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, and notarized if sent by mail Travel Itinerary (roundtrip ticket not necessary) One (1) colored photo, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Letter from Shipping Company Crew List Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Passport with Visa is to be mailed back. Visa fee of 20.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. 9(E) Foreign Government Officials Holders of diplomatic and official U. S. passports who will be traveling to the Philippines on official business for a stay not exceeding 30 days no longer need to apply for a diplomatic or official visa with the Philippine Embassy. However, U. S. government officials must possess passports that are valid for at least six months beyond the contemplated period of stay in the Philippines and a return ticket to the U. S. or to their next country of destination. Passport of applicant (valid at least 6 months from return date) Duly-accomplished Non-Immigrant Visa application form. typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, and notarized if sent by mail One (1) colored photo, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Letter from US government agency requesting issuance of visa or Note Verbale from US State Department Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Passport with Visa is to be mailed back. Visa fee gratis Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. Special Non-Immigrant 47(A) (2) visa Passport of applicant (valid at least 6 months from return date) Two copies of duly-accomplished Non-Immigrant Visa application forms. typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink, and notarized if sent by mail Four (4) colored photos, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Letter from Foundation or Institute stating that the applicant is connected with such program, which is approved by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs Two (2) copies of the Medical Examination Report (FA Form No. 11) duly-accomplished by a licensed physician whose signature must be notarized, and which should not be more than six (6) months from date of application Chest X-ray negative, standard size, to be presented to the Embassy and hand carried to the Philippines Certificate of No Police Record from place of residence of applicant (original and one photocopy) Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Passport with Visa is to be mailed back. Visa fee gratis Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. Immigrant Visa A non-quota immigrant visa may be granted to the spouse and unmarried children under 21 years of age of Philippine citizens (13A) and to former Filipinos who have already acquired foreign citizenships including their spouse and unmarried minor children (13G). 13A and 13 G visa holders are eligible to apply for duty-free shipment to the Philippines. Processing time for 13A and G visas is two (2) weeks after complete submission of requirements. Passport of applicant (valid at least 1 year from date of application). One (1) original and one (1) photocopy of the duly-accomplished Immigrant Visa application form. typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink Four (4) identical colored photos, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. One (1) original and one (1) photocopy of documentary evidence to prove spouses Philippine citizenship and to show applicants relationship to the Philippine citizen, i. e. Philippine passport and marriage contract (original will be returned). NSO Marriage Certificate must be presented if Report of Marriage is not available. Medical Examination Report. duly-accomplished by a licensed physician, which should include his contact details, and which should not be more than six (6) months from date of application, together with laboratory reports (original and one photocopy). Chest X-ray, negative, standard size, or in CD (preferable), to be presented to the Embassy and hand carried to the Philippines. Certificate of No Police Record from place of residence of applicant (original and one photocopy) One (1) original and one (1) photocopy of evidence of sound financial status (e. g. proof of real property, investment/s, bank certification, pension, or notarized Affidavit of Support from a relative in the Philippines, with attached documents to substantiate declaration or claim) Personal appearance for interview Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Passport with Visa is to be mailed back. Visa fee of 150.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. Passport of applicant (valid at least 1 year from date of application). Photocopy of Certificate of Naturalization (original to be presented) One (1) original and one (1) photocopy of the duly-accomplished Immigrant Visa application form. typed or printed legibly in black or blue ink Four (4) identical colored photos, 2 x 2, taken within six months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. One (1) original and one (1) photocopy of documentary evidence to prove applicants former Philippine citizenship, as well as proof of legal relationship for foreign spouse and minor children, such as, birth certificate, Philippine passport, marriage contract (original will be returned) Medical Examination Report. duly-accomplished by a licensed physician, which should include his contact details, and which should not be more than six (6) months from date of application, together with laboratory reports (original and one photocopy). Chest X-ray, negative, standard size, or in CD (preferable), to be presented to the Embassy and hand carried to the Philippines. Certificate of No Police Record from place of residence of applicant (original and one photocopy) Personal appearance for interview Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if Passport with Visa is to be mailed back. Visa fee of 150.00 (non-refundable), payable in cash or money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.). Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. Certificate of Not the Same Person According to the Philippine Bureau of Immigration: Not the Same Person is a document issued to an individual attesting to the fact that s/he is not the person listed and/or included in the Hold Departure Order of the Bureau of Immigration, Watch List Order or Blacklist Order. The requirements under visa issuance, visa extension, student desk, ACR I-card Application Form duly, accomplished (VCU Form 2, available at immigration. gov. ph ) Photocopy of General Application Form, duly accomplished (BI Form No. RADJR 2012 from PIA) Affidavit of Denial, duly notarized Photocopy of the applicants passport (data page and travel stamp page) One 2x2 ID picture If applied by a representative, photocopy of valid ID Walk-in Applicant (Airport Problems Excluded / Offloaded Passenger / DFA Derogatory) Application Form, duly accomplished (VCU Form 2, available at immigration. gov. ph ) Court Clearance (cases within Metro Manila) NBI Clearance (cases outside Metro Manila) If either clearances No. 2 and 3 are not available, submit old certificate of Not the Same Person (if there is no additional names listed in the Derogatory records) Affidavit of Denial, duly notarized Photocopy of the applicants passport (data page and travel stamp page) If applied by a representative, photocopy of valid ID Out of the Country Applicant (former Filipino/Foreign National) Application Form, duly accomplished Download a Not the same person application form from the Bureaus website at immigration. gov. ph or email the Bureau at xinfoimmigration. gov. ph to request an application form Special Power of Attorney, duly notarized by the Philippine Embassy Photocopy of the applicants passport (data page and travel stamp page) Philippine National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, certifying that the applicant is not the person who is in the Derogatory List Photocopy of representatives valid ID Balikbayan Program Under the Balikbayan Program of the Philippines, the following persons are considered Balikbayans: a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one year from the date of last departure a Filipino Overseas Worker and a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and holds a foreign passport (original proof of former Philippine citizenship, such as old Philippine passport, birth certificate, or foreign naturalization papers showing Filipino nationality will be required). Balikbayans are entitled to the following benefits: travel tax exemption visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one year from the date of arrival in the Philippines duty-free shopping privileges up to US1,500.00 Family members (spouse and children) of a Balikbayan who are holding foreign passports are also entitled to Balikbayan privileges, on the condition that they: travel with the Balikbayan pay any applicable immigration fees and observe and comply with immigration rules and regulations. (proof of affiliation may be required) However, a Balikbayan who has acquired the citizenship of a country that falls under the visa-required nationals category per Philippine visa regulations, or his/her family member whose nationality also falls under the cited category, is not entitled to a Balikbayan privilege and is required to obtain an entry visa to the Philippines. TRANSPORT OF PETS Import permit obtained from the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) This can be obtained online via the Application for Import of Pets form. Processing time can take one to three working days. For further questions, email baiquarantinephgmail Health certificate issued by US authority and authenticated by Philippine Embassy or Consulate. Secure a health certificate for each pet from a duly licensed veterinarian or from the U. S. Department of Agriculture. The health certificate should be dated within 30 days before the date of arrival in the Philippines. The health certificate should certify that the animal is free from, and has not been recently exposed to, any dangerous or communicable disease, and that it has been given anti-rabies and other required inoculations. Submit the health certificate/s for authentication to the Philippine Embassy/Consulate (please check the consulate finder or the consulates link in the Embassy website for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates in the U. S.). Enclose self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if authenticated health certificate is to be mailed back to sender. Enclose authentication fee of 25 (non-refundable) on money order made payable to Embassy of the Philippines. Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. Notes: Embassy/Consulate processing time is one (1) day. The Philippine Embassy/Consulate assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. Requirements above (i. e. the import permit from BAI and authenticated health certificate) must be presented at the Philippine airport upon the arrival of the pet. (Failure to present the requirements may result in pet/s being quarantined upon arrival) NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) CLEARANCE (from nbi. gov. ph ) REQUIREMENTS (for first-time applicants living/working abroad): Secure a Fingerprint Card form from the Embassy (Office of the Police Attache)/Consulate and fill it up. For married women, please write your name in the following order: maiden surname (fathers surname), husbands surname, first or given name, and maternal surname (mothers family name). Attach a colored 2 x 2 photograph, taken within three months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Proceed to the police agency in your locality to have your fingerprints impressed (ROLLED IMPRESSION) on the appropriate spaces. The officer /person who fingerprinted you should sign his name and state his official designation on the space provided for the purpose on the card. Have the Fingerprint Card form authenticated by the Secretary of State with jurisdiction over the police agency. Present/Mail the Fingerprint Card for authentication by the Embassy/Consulate General. (please check the Consulate Finder or the Consulates Link for the states covered by the Embassy/Consulates General in the U. S.). Self-addressed return envelope, with appropriate stamps for express or priority mail with tracking numbers via US Postal Service, or with pre-paid mailing envelope from private courier of choice, if authenticated Fingerprint Card is to be mailed back. Authentication fee of 25 (non-refundable), payable in money order, bank draft, certified check or cashiers check, and cash when personally applying. Personal checks and credit cards are not accepted. Send authenticated Fingerprint Card to the NBI for issuance of clearance (please refer to sending instructions below). Note: The Philippine Embassy/Consulate General assumes no responsibility for any delay or loss in the mail, or while the documents are in the custody of the courier service. The applicant should note the tracking numbers of all envelopes used and submitted. By Mail - Enclose Money Order in the amount of Php 200.00 or bank draft, which is negotiable in the Philippines, payable to the Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Ermita 1000 Manila, Philippines. The following are the accredited banks: Philippine National Bank (PNB) Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Co. (HSBC) ANZ A New Zealand Bank METROBANK Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) Mr. Francisco Donozo Attn: Identification and Records Division - Mailed Clearance Section National Bureau of Investigation Taft Ave. Ermita 1000 Manila Philippines Through a Representative in the Philippines Mail the accomplished form to your representative, along with a signed letter authorizing him/her to transact business on your behalf. Your relative may visit the office of the Electronic Data Processing Division (EDPD) in NBI Taft Avenue, Manila for further assistance. Upon receipt of your clearance certificate, please examine it for the presence of the embossed NBI DRY SEAL at its lower left portion. The clearance is invalid without it. You must also affix your clear and properly taken THUMBPRINT on the space provided for on the clearance certificate with the assistance of any local police in your area before submitting it to the end-user. REQUIREMENTS (for applicants living/working abroad renewing their NBI clearance, issued from 1998 onwards): Original NBI clearance, with updated information for address and purpose of clearance indicated otherwise, write Same Data, if none For changes in name, date of birth or place of birth, duly-accomplished Fingerprint Card form, with photocopy of Birth Certificate or Marriage Certificate One (1) colored photo, 2 x 2, taken within three months before the date of application, showing a clear front view of applicants face, with a white background. No sleeveless attire. Blurred or low quality photos are not accepted. Photocopy of your passport with date stamped proving your presence abroad Send all of the above documents to the NBI, following the same SENDING instructions. Note: If NBI clearance was issued prior to 1998, or you have lost your personal copy of the certificate, follow the instructions for First Time applicants from abroad. RENEWAL OF PHILIPPINE DRIVERS LICENSE In accordance with Land Transportation Office (LTO) Administrative Order No. RIB-2008-011 Series of 2007, it is now possible for Filipinos abroad who hold an authentic Philippine drivers license to renew their expired license through their authorized representative in the Philippines. The following documents must be presented by the authorized representative of the applicant to LTO: Original drivers license and receipt (plus one photocopy of each) Photocopy of Philippine passport (first page, visa page and pages showing departure from the Philippines and last arrival overseas) Special Power of Attorney (SPA) from the licensee to the LTO requesting the renewal and authorizing a representative to renew the license on his / her behalf. The SPA must be authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or Consulate General (please refer to Authentication procedures and requirements in the list of Consular Services). Applicants within the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila may apply for renewal at the License Section of the Central Office of the LTO in Quezon City. Representatives who are outside of NCR may apply at the LTO field office of their choice. NOTE: only an OFFICIAL RECEIPT will be issued by the LTO to those who apply for extensions on their drivers license through a representative. A new ID-card can only be issued upon the arrival of the applicant at the LTO in the Philippines and compliance with all requirements for license renewal, including the biometrics capture, medical, vision and drug test. PH REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL MISSIONS According to the Philippine Food and Drug Administration (FDA, formerly BFAD), any foreign organization intending to bring medicines and/or medical equipment to be donated or used during the conduct of medical missions must comply with the requirements of the Department of Healths Bureau of International Health Cooperation (DOH-BIHC). DOH-BIHC shall then facilitate the issuance of a clearance from the FDA and the Bureau of Health Devices and Technology (BHDT) for the drugs, medical supplies and medical equipment, as the case may be. 1. All applications for Foreign Surgical and Medical Missions (FSMM) shall be submitted to the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) who shall forward the same to the following professional groups copy furnished DOH. Click here to download application form (from PMA website, philippinemedicalassociation. org ). 2. Each member of the foreign medical team must submit the following documents in applying for temporary license to practice during the duration of the mission. All documents must be in English or with English translation: a. Valid/current license from country of origin, authenticated by the Embassy/Consulate (please refer to Authentication procedures and requirements in the list of Consular Services) b. Board certification (specialty), authenticated by the Embassy/Consulate (please refer to Authentication procedures and requirements in the list of Consular Services) c. Curriculum vitae, acknowledged by the Philippine Embassy/Consulate (please refer to Authentication procedures and requirements in the list of Consular Services) d. Passport sized picture in four copies (taken within one year) e. Application letter addressed to the President of PMA to contain the following information: - Type of mission (medical, surgical or both) - Duration of the mission and inclusive dates - Names and specialties of the mission team members - Written consent from the host local government executive (governor/mayor) and/or of the health facility where the mission will be conducted f. The following are additional requirements if the foreign mission team members intend to bring drugs, and/or medicines, medical supplies and medical equipment to be donated or used during the mission: - Itemized list of the items together with the quantity and the expiration dates for drugs and medicines - Deed of donation authenticated at the country of origin (please refer to Authentication procedures and requirements in the list of Consular Services) - Deed of acceptance from the host hospital/Local Government Unit (LGU) - Drugs and medicines to be donated should have a shelf life of at least 12 months upon arrival in the country and the said medicine shall be used solely for the scheduled mission. - Application must be submitted 60 days before the date of mission to facilitate clearance/s from DOH and other agencies. G. Letter of certification from the sponsoring host organization (LGU or Non-Government Organization (NGO)) certifying the need and type of mission to be conducted. Cost of post-care mission of morbidities/mortalities arising from the mission will be shouldered as well by the host organization. H. Proof of juridical entity (certified true copy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration must be submitted. i. Notarized letter of guarantee from both the medical mission group and the host organization assuming full responsibility for the outcome of the missions. 3. The PMA, upon receipt of all requirements, will forward the application to the concerned specialty societies for evaluation of credentials. The DOH will be informed immediately of the presence of drugs, medical supplies and medical equipment. 4. The DOH shall facilitate issuance of clearance by its FDA and BHDT for the above mentioned goods. 5. After the evaluation of the missioners credentials by the concerned Specialty Society, the PMA shall send a letter of endorsement to DOH. 6. The DOH shall then endorse the documents to Professional Regulation Commission (PRC). 7. The PRC, after final review, shall issue the Special Temporary Permit to Practice to concerned foreign missioners. 8. The lead time for the processing of the application are as follows: PMA - 2 weeks before the mission date DOH - 1 week before the mission date PRC - 3 weeks before the mission date 9. Post-mission report shall be submitted by the head of the foreign surgical and/or medical missions, concurred/noted by the President of the local component society of PMA, and/or specialty society and the LGU concerned, to the oversight agencies (DOH, PMA, PRC) 15 days after the completion of the mission. All records and audio-visual documents must also be submitted in triplicate form. The post-mission report should contain the following minimum basic information: No. and age of cases seen Diagnosis of patients List of medicines distributed and surgical interventions done Endorsements to the necessary health facilities (follow-up, further evaluation and management) Morbidities and mortalities, if any 10. All materials submitted to the oversight agencies shall be the property of the Philippine counterpart and may not be used for advertisement, solicitation or medical publication without the written and expressed approval of the local medical society and/or specialty society of the PMA and the local counterpart. Any intellectual output as journal or publication must include the local physicians as senior authors. 11. Former Filipino Registered Health Professionals who are part of a Medical/Surgical Mission Team may practice their profession in the Philippines upon presentation of proof of valid and current PRC licenses. Otherwise, they have to renew their licenses upon submission of the following requirements (Presidential Decree No. 541): Photocopy of current/valid passport (page 1 and the page showing the date of arrival in the Philippines) Photocopy of PRC license and valid certificate of registration License/Certificate of Registration in the adopted country or Certification of employment with letterhead indicating the job description within the definition of the applicants profession Four pieces of recent passport size pictures (taken within one year) Payment of prescribed fees at PRC Certificated of training and board certification (for specialists) Application for Temporary Special Permit (PRC form 103-A) 12. Foreign Religious groups/missionaries practicing medicine in the country shall abide by the same requirements and adhere to the guidelines. These missioners who serve for longer period of time shall signify their intention to continue living in the Philippines to pursue missionary works. They shall secure Special Temporary Permit, which is to be renewed annually. The following must be submitted: Certification for their congregation that the medical works are purely for charity purposes and with no remuneration involved whatsoever. A certification from the congregation assuming the responsibility for any action of the said physician The missionary should submit to PMA an annual mission report including a list of patients treated The missionary is required to attend PMA or component societies Continuing Medical Education (CME) related activities once a year to update their medical knowledge. The missionary who conducted his missionary works in the province must coordinate with the PMA component society for proper identification and monitoring. According to the DOH-BIHC, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) may be contacted to assist organizers of foreign medical missions. The CFOs contact details are: Commission on Filipinos Overseas Citigold Center, 1345 President Quirino Avenue, Corner South Superhighway, Manila Telephone Nos. (632) 561-8327, 552-4701 Fax No. 561-8332 Mobile Nos. (63) 9175630773 / (63) 9175630782 Email: imelda. nicolascfo. gov. ph The DOHs Revised Policies and Guidelines in the Conduct of FSMM may be found at doh. gov. ph (click on Doing Business gt Medical Missions). Below is the DOHs complete text on the Procedural Guide for Shipping Medicines/Drugs for Medical Missions . Pursuant to item VII, No. 3 (f) of the Joint Administrative Order No. 2009-0030, of the DOH, the PRC, and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the following are additional requirements if the foreign mission team members intend to bring drugs, and/or medicines, medical supplies and medical equipment to be donated or used during the mission: Itemized list of the items together with the quantity and the expiration dates for drugs and medicines Flight details Deed of donation authenticated at the country of origin Deed of acceptance from the host hospital/Local Government Unit Drugs and medicines to be donated should heave a shelf life of at least 12 months upon arrival in the country and the said medicine shall be used solely for the scheduled mission Application must be submitted 60 days before the date of mission to facilitate clearance/s from DOH and other agencies With regard to the entry of drugs which need to be regulated by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), please refer to the PDEAs website at pdea. gov. ph . Please be also informed that the donated medicines are subject to duties and taxes. These shall only be exempted from duties if these are consigned to government and private (primary and secondary) hospitals duly licensed to operated by the DOH, and welfare/relief dispensing organizations/agencies registered and/or accredited by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and registered with the SEC. Even if the donation is exempted from duties, it will still be subject to Value-Added Tax (VAT), which is computed at twelve percent (12) of the total cost of shipment. In securing duty-free clearance, the following documents must be submitted to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the Department of Finance (DOF): A. From the Donor: Deed of Donation duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or Consulate Packing list of donated items. If medicines would be included in the shipment, kindly submit the itemized list of drugs and quantity to be donated indicating brand/generic name, dosage forms/strengths, batch/lot number, expiration date of at least one (1) year upon receipt, and name/address of the manufacturer and Shipping Documents (i. e. bill of lading). The original copy will be needed by the consignee/local counterpart in processing the release of donation. B. From the Donee/Consignee: Letter to the DOH-BIHC requesting endorsement to the FDA for the issuance of clearance. The letter request should be submitted with the complete list of drugs and quantity to be donated, with the following information: brand/generic name, formulation (with English translation), dosage forms/strengths, batch/lot number, expiration date of at least one (1) year upon receipt, and name/address of the manufacturer. Letter to the NEDA and DOF requesting for the issuance of duty-free clearance for the donation Duly notarized Deed of Acceptance Distribution plan for medicines Current and valid DOH License to Operate, if hospital DSWD License to Operate and Certification of Accreditation, if non-government organization and FDA Certificate of Product Registration (for medicines) The donee/consignee in the Philippines may apply for the clearances for the donated items. It is important that the name listed as donee/consignee in the deed of donation must be the same as that appearing in the shipping documents. We suggest that the shipping of any donation to the Philippines should be withheld unless prior coordination with the donee/consignee has been made, and appropriate endorsements/clearances from government agencies have been secured. ISSUANCE OF OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT CERTIFICATE OEC or exit clearance/pass is a document certifying the regularity of a workers recruitment and documentation and ensures exemption from travel tax and airport terminal fee. It is presented at the POEA Labor Assistance Center (LAC) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) counter at the airports prior to departure. The OES serves as the workers guarantee that he/she is covered by government protection and benefits. The requirements for the issuance of OEC are as follows: Copy of passport (page showing photo and personal data) Copy of valid work visa, work permit or equivalent document (e. g. Form I-797) Accomplished Balik-Manggagawa Information Sheet and US equivalent of P100 (between US2 and US3, depending on current Php-US exchange rate). OEC issued by POLO is for one-time use only and valid for 60 days. This means that the vacationing OFW should leave the Philippines within 60 days upon the issuance of OEC. OEC may be secured personally at the POLO, Philippine Embassy, 1600 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036 or via mail. If via mail, the OFW should include a self-addressed/stamped return envelope. For security purposes, the payment should be in money order payable to Labor Office. For inquiries, please contact 1-202-467-9425/26 or e-mail wdcpolousagmail . ON-SITE OWWA MEMBERSHIP PROGRAM Membership in Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is mandatory for all overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). All OWWA members are covered by life insurance and other social benefits implemented by OWWA. The On-Site Membership Program is an enrolment or registration scheme for OFWs who are in the work destinations. It shall cover the following: OFWs whose OWWA membership had expired and OFWs who enroll as first-time members, provided they are gainfully employed overseas at the time of registration. The following are the requirements for OWWA enrolment/registration: Copy of passport (page showing photo and personal data) Proof of employment such as work contract/permit, employment offer, pay slip, certificate of employment from the company/employer, company identification card, and/or other relevant evidence of employment Accomplished Balik-Manggagawa Information Sheet and US25 membership fee. OWWA enrolment/registration may be done personally at the POLO, Philippine Embassy, 1600 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036 or via mail. If via mail, the OFW should include a self-addressed/stamped return envelope. For security purposes, the payment should be in money order payable to OWWA. For inquiries, please contact 1-202-467-9413 or e-mail owwawashingtondcyahoo . EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT VERIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION The POEA requires the verification of the employment contract of the OFW before he/she is granted an OEC. Contract verification ensures that there is actual existence of job and employer for the OFW and that the provisions in the contract meet the minimum requirements of the POEA and that of the host government. The following are the requirements for contract verification: Approved work permit or visa Employers Information Card. (If the employer in the work permit is an individual, use the Individual Information Card Form. If the work permit is approved under a business, use the Business Information Card Form) Copy of the business license. (If the work permit is approved under business.) Copy of identification of the employer or company representative signing the employment contract (e. g. passport, drivers license, etc.) and Payment of US35 in US Bank Draft or Money Order payable to the Embassy of the Philippines (or Philippine Consulate General, if application is made at one of the Philippine Consulates General in the U. S.) for verification and authentication fee. If the transaction will be done by mail, another US Bank Draft or Money Order should be secured payable to Fedex. The amount shall depend on the Fedex quote to be obtained by the employer/company for shipping the verified and authenticated documents from the Philippine Embassy, 1600 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036 to the point of destination of the documents (either back to the employer or company or directly to the address of the worker in the Philippines). The turn around time for contract verification and authentication is three working days. Employers/company representatives are advised to contact POLO at 1-202-467-9425/26 or e-mail wdcpolousagmail before sending the documents for verification and authentication. POLOs mailing address is Embassy of the Philippines, 1600 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC, 20036 U. S.A. Executive Summary With the first peaceful transfer of power in the highly competitive parliamentary elections of October 2012, after one year of cohabitation and another year of unchallenged rule of the Georgian Dream coalition, high expectations of socioeconomic improvements and justice yielded disappointment among the population. The economy did not really improve. On the contrary, it contracted and did not provide an expected increase in employment. The new government tried to depoliticize the public sector and to achieve justice. It released prisoners and summoned former officials from the new opposition, the United National Movement (UNM). Political motivation for bringing them to court cannot be denied. Nor can the violations of fundamental human rights during UNMs own reign. More than ever, Georgia is desperately in need of common ground with inclusive and transparent state institutions, an empowered civil society and a much more educated population able to provide homegrown entrepreneurship to increase the economic output and create employment with the help of foreign investments. Further integration with Western structures, mainly the EU and NATO, requires serious reforms, the positive, as well as negative, implications of which need to be openly addressed. At the same time, public debate needs to be institutionalized. History and Characteristics of Transformation A series of dramatic ups and downs have characterized Georgias political and economic transformation. The development of the country, which from the outset was hampered by the heavy burden of two unresolved ethnic conflicts and a sharp economic decline, could roughly be divided into six phases. The first phase was marked by Georgias first breakthrough to a democratic political regime, the parliamentary elections of October 1990. The election brought to power a heterogeneous umbrella movement under the leadership of former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Despite his landslide victory in the May 1991 presidential elections, Gamsakhurdia failed to consolidate his rule, which mainly rested on his ability to mobilize using charisma. As a result, he was easily driven out of office by a violent coup dtat in 1992. The second phase, dominated by the return of former Georgia Communist Party head Eduard Shevardnadze, began with a brief interlude of chaos following Gamsakhurdias ousting. During the first three years of his rule, Shevardnadze tried to get rid of the competing gangs of criminals that had run havoc in the country and originally supported his return. The adoption of a constitution and the successful organization of elections signaled a fragile consolidation of power. Notwithstanding quite impressive achievements in terms of ending violence and introducing the formal requisites of democratic statehood, and despite massive international assistance, Shevardnadze ultimately did not succeed in stable governance. The only continuous feature was clear dominance by the executive. In contrast, the shape of the parliament was adapted to varying needs. Until 1995, the abolishment of any kind of electoral threshold ensured a highly fragmented legislature. After the creation of the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) in 1993, which was designed to serve as Shevardnadzes party of power, the introduction of an electoral threshold resulted in a stable majority for the CUG. Pluralism was mainly confined to intra-elite competition within the ruling party, which was composed of former Soviet apparatchiks and a group of young reformers. In the third phase, beginning in 2001, the distribution of official fiefdoms among the different cliques of the elite severely hampered economic growth and gave rise to popular unrest. Confronted with a decline in its authority, the ruling party adopted authoritarian measures, a move that provoked an internal split. Prominent representatives of the wing of young reformers inside CUG, headed by Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, formed a new opposition that assumed power in the aftermath of popular protests against the rigging of parliamentary elections in November 2003. The relative ease with which Shevardnadze was overthrown during what was to be called the Rose Revolution can be explained partly by the existence of democratic facades erected under his rule, fomented by a dense network of NGOs and independent media outlets. In the fourth phase, which followed the peaceful revolution, the victorious triumvirate of Saakashvili, Burjanadze and Zhvania rushed to stabilize the situation. In a wise move, they joined together to create a new party named the United National Movement (UNM). Supported by more than 96 of the popular vote, the charismatic leader Saakashvili seized an overwhelming victory in the presidential elections of January 2004. The newly created party won more than two-thirds of the seats in the March 2004 parliamentary elections. Control over the executive and legislative branch of the government made implementing a far-reaching structural reform agenda possible. As a result, the government achieved outstanding results in terms of curbing corruption, streamlining an inefficient administration, improving tax collection and providing public goods for an economy that underwent a significant upsurge. Despite these impressive results, critics of the new elite pointed to serious deficits and even setbacks in terms of institutionalizing checks and balances. This concerned the parliament, as much as the judiciarys independence and the media. The fifth phase, beginning in the fall of 2007, was marked by the governments violent response to demonstrations, violence that seriously undermined Saakashvilis democratic credentials. Growing authoritarian tendencies, as well as the inability of the ruling elite to translate dynamic economic growth into tangibly improved living standards for a majority of impoverished citizens, gave rise to a series of popular protests while feeding the momentum behind deep political polarization. A significant slowdown of economic growthcaused not only by the global financial crisis, but rather by a serious deterioration in the overall investment climate in the aftermath of the war against Russia in 2008further undermined stability. The sixth phase started with the defeat of the ruling UNM by the opposition coalition Georgian Dream (GD) in the highly competitive parliamentary elections of October 2012. Initially this led for one year to cohabitation with President Saakashvili during which tensions prevailed. Several former ministers and prominent UNM leaders were arrested or summoned to court in an attempt to hold them responsible for numerous human rights violations. However, how the government coped with this legacy caused international concern and accusations of selectively applying justice. The presidential elections on 27 October 2013, despite some irregularities in the vote count and isolated incidents of political violence, were considered free and fair, and resulted in a straight victory for the GD candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, with over 62 of votes, which further consolidated GDs power. The party is now formally in charge of both the presidency and the government and has a majority in parliament. However, Margvelashvili is not a member of any political party, and there are rising tensions between him and Prime Minister Gharibashvili. Finally, the municipal elections in June 2014 completed the democratic transfer of power from UNM to GD at all levels. No less important, for the first time, the former ruling party managed to survive its loss of power intact and formed an opposition faction in parliament. Giorgi Margvelashvilis inauguration on 17 November 2013 marked the entry into force of constitutional changes adopted under the previous leadership that mark a shift from a presidential to a mixed system, significantly diminishing the presidents powers. Bidzina Ivanishvili, who left the office of the prime minister voluntarily in November 2013, introduced Irakli Garibashvili as his successor. The latter assumed the constitutionally most powerful office of prime minister since independence, confirmed by the GD-dominated parliament. In 2014, Georgia was relatively calm, besides the fact that the Ukraine crisis resonated there. The GD Coalition experienced its first serious crack with Irakli Alasanias dismissal from the post of defense minister in November and the subsequent withdrawal of the Free Democrats from the coalition. However, the publics appraisal of the GD coalitions performance has decreased in 2014, primarily due to a lack of socioeconomic improvements. The year 2013 turned out to be a transition period, with weak economic activity during the first half, characterized by slower private investment, weak credit growth and budget underspending. Thus, the government had to revise its growth target downwards from 6 to 2.5 at the end of 2013. In 2014, a GDP growth of 4.8 was recorded, and in 2015, only 2 growth is expected. While tackling unemployment is the number one issue among the population, there has been little improvement in this regard. The most important foreign policy event in recent times is the conclusion of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement on 27 June 2014. It contains serious reform commitments on the part of Georgia in exchange for visa regime liberalization and access to the EUs internal market through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and demonstrates Georgias intention to move closer to the European Union. The BTI combines text analysis and numerical assessments. The score for each question is provided below its respective title. The scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). Transformation Status 7 Organization of the Market and Competition Market-based competition 6 The legal and institutional framework for a market economy created by the previous government since 2004 continued to be an important factor in stabilizing Georgias economy. However, it turned out to be somewhat hollow in practice. After the change in government, past violations of property rights and formal and informal interventions by state authorities in private businesses became topics of public debate. The Georgian Dream coalition set out to depoliticize business and reinstate property rights. However, there have been new complaints (e. g. by TI Georgia) that the last two years have been marked by artificial obstacles and gratuitous regulations delivering negative messages to investors. So, at the end of 2014, the time limits for enacting 10 key reforms were postponed for a year. Another cause of concern is the new Law on the Legal Status of Aliens and Stateless Persons, drafted by the Ministry of Justice, which entered into effect on 1 September 2014 and tightened regulations on temporary residence in Georgia. The prohibition on the sale of agricultural land to foreigners, new postal service regulations, a prolonged process of reforming the Labor Code or new labor migration regulations provoked foreign businessmen, in particular, to seek recourse from the courts, often with success. No cases of administered pricing were reported. A World Bank study in 2013 found that, in 2008, 30.1 of GDP was produced in the informal sector with very little or no competition. At the same time, in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, Georgia further advanced to 69th position (over previous years: 2013-2014, 72nd 2012-2013, 77th and 2011-2012: 88th) and was characterized as an efficiency driven economy. The main contributors to this improvement are the macroeconomic environment (although marked by significant volatility), financial market development and goods market efficiency. The areas that mostly worsened are health and primary education. An inadequately educated workforce (20.2) and lack of access to financing (18.8) represent the major obstacles to doing business, followed by inadequate supply of infrastructure (10.4), poor work ethic in the national labor force (9.0) and insufficient capacity to innovate (8.3). The Association Agreement, including the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), concluded between the EU and Georgia on 27 June 2014, will fundamentally change business. These changes are focused on the alignment of the domestic business environment with that of the EU. While this will contribute to the economic sustainability in the long run, it creates additional costs and requires serious reform efforts in the coming years. Anti-monopoly policy 6 Georgias presumably highly liberalized economy with only few formal legislative and administrative barriers did not lead, however, to increased competition to the contrary, it enabled some well-established market players to engage in anticompetitive practices and abuse their market power. The new government is trying to regain some lost ground. On 21 March 2014, the Georgian parliament amended the Law on Free Trade and Competition as well as the Georgian Law on State Procurement with a number of important changes in the regulatory framework. It has split the Competition and State Procurement Agency into two independent legal entities: the Competition Agency and the State Procurement Agency. The amendments also foresee stronger safeguards for the Competition Agencys independence and supervisory powers over state interventions that undermine competition, on the one hand. But, on the other hand, they allow economic agents to take their cases over alleged breaches of competition law straight to courts or to challenge the Competition Agencys decisions there. If functioning properly, the agency will ensure that the markets openness and transparency is secured and that the authorities do not impose administrative, legal and discriminatory obstacles for entering the market and illegally restrict competition. The agency will also determine an economic agents market share in the relevant market by applying methodological guidelines of market analysis. The law lists potential cases of abuse of a dominant position, sets criteria for determining group domination in case of several economic agents, defines unfair competition and also describes cases where an economic agent is obliged to notify the agency about concentration. As a result, economic agents will know in advance what types of actions could qualify as unfair competition and can anticipate and avoid such actions in the future. These measures are expected to contribute to curbing the so-called elite corruption, often discussed in Georgia, such as setting privileged conditions in the market for individual companies, mostly those with political ties. Liberalization of foreign trade 9 The foreign trade regime adopted in Georgia remains comparatively liberal. It has only a limited number of customs control institutions, import duties and procedures for customs clearance. Only a very restricted number of goods require licensing for import and export. A number of bilateral agreements with the majority of developed countries have significantly contributed to facilitating access to Georgian goods on international markets. As a result, Georgia managed to further improve its relatively high ranking in the World Banks Trading Across Borders Index from 38th in 2012 to 33rd in 2014. Georgias overall foreign-trade volumes in 2014 were 5 higher than in 2013, according to preliminary data from GeoStat, the National Statistics Department. Exports for 2014 were valued at 2.9 billion, or 2 less than the previous year, while imports totaled 8.6 billion, 7 more than the year before. The trade deficit was 5.7 billion, or approximately 50 of the countrys overall trade volumes. The impact of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Georgia and the EU on Georgias trade balance is to date unclear. The DCFTA differs from other international trade agreements in that it covers not only market access provisions (tariffs, customs and mutual recognition of technical standards), but also aims at harmonizing Georgian national legislation with the EU-Acquis. Banking system 7 Over the last two years, Georgias financial sector has expanded only slightly after a pre-2011 period of rapid growth. Bank operations became an essential part of daily life, though there is still a lot of room for further diversification of banking services. The banking sector operates within an increasingly stable legal framework, as the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) enforces progressive and stringent regulations, including capital and liquidity requirements, on commercial banks. The NBG is gradually introducing reforms to create a more advanced risk-based approach to supervision and to further harmonize its regulations with relevant EU directives and Basel II/III principles. During 2013, there were 21 commercial banks and foreign bank branches operating in Georgia, 20 of which (including two branches of foreign banking institutions) had foreign capital participation. Georgian banking sectors total assets (including both domestic commercial banks and branches of foreign banks in Georgia) was 17.3 billion GEL as of 31 December 2013 (in 2012: 14.4 billion GEL) with the five largest banks accounting for 77.3 of total assets. Georgian banks are prudently capitalized with a capitalization ratio standing at 16.8. Georgias liquidity ratio was up by 1.5 to 37.3 at year-end 2013. The bank capital to assets ratio has decreased from 21.9 in 2004 to 16.6 in 2011, and only slightly increased to 16.8 in 2013. Domestic credits have increased continuously since 2009 from 5.8 billion GEL to 12.4 billion GEL in the third quarter of 2014. Loans in the Georgian banking sector thus increased in 2013 by 21.0 (29.4 in total individual loans, 14.7 in corporate loans). According to World Bank data, in 2012 Georgia had one of the smallest percentages of nonperforming loans among all eastern European countries. However, nonperforming bank loans increased from 3 in 2013 to 3.5 in 2014. The level of domestic savings in Georgia is still quite low relative to the financing needs of the country, even if customer deposits increased by 26.5 to 9.7 billion GEL in 2013 and further to 10.7 billion GEL in the third quarter of 2014 (3.9 billion GEL in 2009). The de-dollarization trend continued in 2013, with foreign currency deposits accounting for 60 of total deposits at the end of 2013 (64 in 2012). NBGs refinancing rate decreased during 2013 to 3.75, compared to 5.25 at the end of 2012, mainly due to its intention to boost lending and economic activities in the country. The low ratio of bank loans to GDP at 39.4 in 2013 demonstrates that Georgias major problem is access to finance. This is grounded in persistent structural obstacles to financial sector development. First of all, the small market size with only limited real sector penetration prevent economies of scale for Georgian banks. Secondly, the moderate country ratings on international markets imply a continued reliance on external sources of funding for commercial banks with a tendency for short-term lending. Thirdly, low financial reporting standards among Georgian companies and low levels of financial literacy among the economically active population prevent proper use of business loans. Finally, long-term lending is done almost exclusively in foreign currencies, which creates a FX credit risk, realized in early 2015 with the dramatic depreciation of the Georgian lari. Thus, the dependency on investments in the Georgian banking industry by international financial institutions continues. 8 Currency and Price Stability Anti-inflation / forex policy 7 After suffering from high inflation in 2011 (8.5), the Georgian economy experienced deflation at -0.9 in 2012 and at -0.5 in 2013. As of January 2015, annual inflation stood at 1.4 again. Thus, the Georgian National Bank increased its key policy rate by 50 basis points to 4.5. The intention was to tighten monetary policy in late January 2015, amid depreciation of Georgias national currency (GEL) against the U. S. dollar, and to neutralize additional inflation risks, which are to a significant degree dependent on exogenous factors. The last time the NBG changed its key rate was in February 2014, when it was increased by 25 basis points to 4. During the period under review, the inflation rate was mainly influenced by price changes in the following groups: food and non-alcoholic beverages (where prices increased by 0.7) and housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (with a price increase of 0.4). In February 2015, ex-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili blamed the National Bank of Georgia and its president, Giorgi Kadagidze, who was appointed to his post under the UNM government, for inaction or incorrect actions in response to the Laris depreciation. These accusations were rejected by the latter. No other attempts at interference from outside in the internal workings of the NBG have so far been reported. Financial volatility is influenced by upward inflationary pressures and reflects a rising domestic demand for imports. As Georgia imports virtually all of its natural gas and oil products, and even essential food products, there is rapid growth of the money supply and an expansion in net foreign assets. In addition, increasing volumes of imports are not matched by a corresponding growth in exports, creating a persistent current accounts deficit. All this makes it difficult for the government to pursue a consistent anti-inflation policy. It is an important challenge for the country to develop a powerful export sector in order to reduce the foreign-trade gap (in 2014 the trade deficit was 5.732 million or 50 of the total turnover). Georgia ranks slightly below the average for post-Soviet Eurasia on macroeconomic stability. While risks to macroeconomic stability lessened in 2012, Georgia continuously performs worse than its peers in terms of poverty and inequality. Due to the political insecurities of the recent transition period, macroeconomic stability has been temporarily disrupted. No decisive increase in exports was recorded, while FDI growth never reached the volume it enjoyed before the war with Russia in 2008. Foreign debt has decreased from 39.3 of GDP in 2010 to 32.2 in 2013. Georgias gross external debt amounted to 13.8 billion, of which the public sector accounted for 31.9 as of 30 September 2012, according to the National Bank of Georgia. As of December 2014, the gross external debt is 13.1 billion. Georgias current account balance was halved to -923.1 million in 2013, up from -1.8507 billion in 2012. The total debt service grew from 1.605 billion in 2011 to 1.779 billion in 2012 and to 1.644 billion in 2013. With increased state expenditures, primarily on social assistance, it is not yet clear how the government will attempt to reduce the deficit. Fiscal consolidation could represent a move forward to a more responsible attitude by the government. Georgia recorded a government budget deficit equal to 2.9 of GDP in 2013 (3.5 in 2012). 9 Private Property Property rights 6 The World Banks Registration of Private Property Index 2014 again ranked Georgia first among the countries surveyed with one procedure within one day. This positive figure is only overshadowed by the increase in cases of violations of private property by affiliates of the previous government. These are pending in court. These cases indicate that amendments to the laws on registration of immovable property, in particular, have closed substantial gaps in the countrys legislation. Improper implementation during Saakashvilis administration revealed severe institutional weaknesses in the judiciary and tax administration agencies. Both are quite vulnerable to executive interference and tend to ignore norms of procedural justice. However, the Georgian Dream coalition has declared its intention to curb the arbitrary disposition of public and private property, reestablish justice in dubious cases, guarantee property rights, and bring more transparency to both past and future transactions. Private enterprise 7 There were serious infringements on property rights before 2012 including abandonment or citizens handing over property to the state as a gift, arbitrary title registration in the name of the state to property already registered by the owners and missing transparency in government launched large-scale privatization programs. The new authorities tried to secure interests in both real and personal property which are recognized and recorded. However, deficiencies in the operation of the court system hampers foreign investors, especially, from realizing their rights to property offered as security. The improvements so far were acknowledged in the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom where Georgias score is 73.0, making its economy the 22nd freest (primarily due to freedom from corruption, monetary freedom and the management of government spending). State companies still remain one of the countrys major employers, where labor conflicts with trade unions have occurred. Under new regulations, the public postal service came into conflict with private providers. Privatizations were conducted mostly by the previous authorities before they left office. Their conformity to the market still needs to be studied. 10 Welfare Regime Social safety nets 5 Recent years have seen significant efforts by the Georgian government to improve the existing welfare regime, which is, however, still far from satisfying basic needs. All social benefits are solely funded out of general taxation. The government provides a range of income support to families and individuals including targeted social assistance (using a proxy means test to identify the poorest households), universal pensions, and categorical benefits, such as IDP and disability allowances. From the poorest 20 of Georgian households, 25 receive cash benefits from the state. Pensions reach 61 of the bottom quintile. However, 28 of the bottom quintile has never applied for assistance, as an UNICEF report detected. When the Georgian Dream coalition entered office, they increased social spending, which accounts for about 35 of the 2015 state budget. As a result, the threshold for getting social assistance has been lowered and support to IDPs and war veterans has been improved. From 1 July 2013, all citizens were entitled to basic health care. Minimum pensions were raised from 100 to 125 GEL in April 2013 and again to 150 GEL (about 90) in September 2013 (with a further rise by GEL 10 due in September 2015). Depending on length of service, a sum of 2-10 GEL is added monthly to that minimum rate. Thus, half of the budget for the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection for 2015 (1.39 billion GEL out of 2.785 billion GEL) or 17.3 of total budget spending is allocated for pensions. The retirement age for women is 60 and 65 for men. In 2013, there were about 694,000 pensioners registered with the Georgian social service agency. The average life expectancy of 74.2 years (males 69.3, females 79.0 years) lies just below the European average of about 75 years. If not seriously addressed by a consistent reform, the costs for pensions in the state budget will explode in coming years. In addition to the need for greater financial support for social programs, greater support for self-help is also needed. Georgian community, governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as international organizations, have demonstrated growing interest in establishing additional social and health-related assistance for citizens. However, until now, all these efforts have done little to significantly reduce overall poverty and vulnerability, which is of a systemic nature. Equal opportunity 6 Georgia is still far from ensuring equal opportunities to all its citizens. Social and economic vulnerability in Georgia is directly coupled with restricted opportunities for some minorities, internally displaced persons (IDPs), people with disabilities and the population living in remote mountainous regions. Significant differences persist between rural and urban areas and between the poorer and the more developed regions of the country in terms of access to infrastructure services. Gender inequality remains an issue of concern, even if there are some improvements. The proportion of women in parliament increased from 6 in 2008 to 11 in 2012. The voluntary gender quota inclusion of women on party lists increased from 20 to 30. For the parties that comply with this provision, more budget funds are allocated. However, the proportion of women in local councils increased only slightly from 11 to 11.8 after the municipal elections in 2014. A Gender Equality National Action Plan for 2014-2016 was adopted to achieve greater gender equality in different areas of political, social and economic life. However, education enrollment rates show no significant difference between female and male students, while in tertiary education there is a higher rate of female students. Gender gaps are more evident in the field of employment, where the prospects for career success and equal remuneration for women remain limited. While unemployment was significantly higher among males (16.5) than females (12.3) as of 2013, according to official statistics, a higher number of women reported as employed appear in reality to be self-employed, a significant proportion of them in agriculture and in petty trade. Although there exists no legal discrimination against ethnic minorities, their representation in state jobs is disproportionately low. This can only in part be explained by the lack of proficiency in the Georgian language a necessary precondition for taking many state jobs as proficiency has increased over the last decade, mainly among the younger generation. The situation of ethnic minorities, particularly in urban areas, has improved as well. However, especially with regard to integration into the educational system and in the labor market, there are still obstacles to overcome that are mainly grounded in public perception and discriminatory hiring practices. One important aspect of social inequality is the stigma carried by representatives of sexual minorities, and also by disabled persons. In the latter case, some initial steps have been taken to integrate the disabled into society, jobs and educational institutions. Still another issue is the frequently expressed, general intolerance toward representatives of non-traditional religious denominations, e. g. Jehovahs Witnesses. A new policy tool for creating better opportunities that has been slowly introduced by the current administration, while fully neglected by the previous government, is employment policy. In order to better coordinate supply and demand on the labor market, vocational training is garnering more attention. The impact of this approach is not yet measurable, as preparation by the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs is ongoing. 11 Economic Performance Output strength 6 After several years of rapid economic growth at an average of 6 annually, Georgias GDP stands now at 16.13 billion and its GDP per capita increased from 922 (2003) to 3,681 (2014). However, its economy has still not reached the GPD level of 1989. Economic growth markedly slowed down in the past two years, which happened largely due to uncertainty after the October 2012 parliamentary elections, low investment and slow budget execution (because the government withheld certain investments from infrastructure development). Only in the quarter after the October 2013 presidential elections did economic growth recover, picking up speed to reach 4.8 in 2014. Remittances from Georgian migrant workers, mainly from Russia, were until recently the most reliable and least volatile source of external monetary inflow that compensated inadequate employment opportunities at home. In recent years, the remittances inflow was almost twice as much as the FDI, but now suffers from Russias economic crisis. Flows are more stable from EU countries. The declining trend of FDI in Georgia continued through 2013 and 2014 in most sectors. A significant increase in investments was observed only in the fields of energy, mining, transport and communications, while the largest decrease occurred in the construction sector. Both exports and imports drastically decreased from the second semester of 2014, after a positive trend in 2013 that took place mainly due to the removal of the Russian trade ban. Georgian authorities state that the drop in exports was caused by several external factors and specifically the difficult political and economic situation in Russia and Ukraine. The two countries imported less wine, alcohol, mineral water and citrus than usual. The deepening of the crisis in Russia also led to a drop in remittances (-23) and tourism, which, coupled with modest foreign investment, led to downward pressure on the Lari exchange rate that further deteriorated in the beginning of 2015. Georgias exports to the EU and Turkey are assessed to be significantly below its potential. The share of exports to the EU remained at an almost stable level of 20, while exports to Turkey have declined over the last decade. Even if exports to the EU are expected to be enhanced by joining the DCFTA, the unsophisticated export basket continues to be a challenge if not diversified to become more competitive. As a consequence of the decrease in exports and increase of imports, the trade balance in 2014 widened by 12 compared to 2013. Only tourism has positioned itself with about 25 growth per year as the most important service export in Georgia. In 2013, it accounted for almost one third of the total service export and 12 of GDP. 12 Sustainability Environmental policy 5 Georgia possesses rich biodiversity, microclimates and cultural landscapes, but is especially sensitive to economic interventions into vulnerable ecosystems. The comprehensive but ineffective legal framework for environmental protection established in the 1990s has undergone excessive deregulation since 2004, in conjunction with economic liberalization. Even with the Green Party joining the Georgian Dream coalition, this trend was not really reversed by the new government (the partys only deputy in parliament left the coalition within a year). Georgias environmental management remains under threat of shortsighted economic interests. Notwithstanding growing protests from the affected population and civil society activists, this has resulted in unsustainable use of natural resources causing in addition to the impact of global climate change serious environmental degradation that is especially devastating in agricultural, mountainous and coastal regions of Georgia, causing an increased number of eco-migrants. Exacerbating the situation of global climate change is the absence of strategies and capacities for sustainable resource management (waste, water, forests, glaciers). Official leasing contracts are, as a rule, short-term and do not provide any incentives for a sustainable use of resources. As a consequence, there is an alarming degree of deforestation in Georgia, which increases the likelihood of soil erosion, landslides and flooding. The construction of several hydroelectric plants, which could have a substantial impact on ecosystems, has been openly resisted by environmental NGOs, such as Green Alternative, and local populations. However, this has not hindered plans, in particular, for construction of the huge Khudoni Dam on the Enguri River. The construction of seven hydroelectric plants in the Kazbegi District and in the Dariali Valley has already begun. The planning and construction of these hydroelectric plants have not been sufficiently transparent they have been conducted without the necessary consultations with ecological experts or open public discussion. The government tends to emphasize the economic advantages of these projects and trivializes possible ecological risks, which became more visible during the reporting period. Another problematic issue is waste disposal and the situation of canal systems, which are the source of numerous infections. The situation of the countrys polluted lakes and rivers also requires urgent action. Disaster risk reduction measures are to be prepared to prevent increased weather - and climate-related hazards. Education policy / RampD 6 Although education policy in Georgia has been marked by increased investment, and the education system has undergone serious reforms, its quality remains a major problem that the government has been trying to address since 2014, in particular with the elaboration of a new Education Strategy. However, since 2006, despite a real increase of nearly 47 in education expenditure, public spending on education has remained around 3 of GDP and therefore lacks serious investment to substantially improve the sector. The poor performance of Georgian pupils in international assessments like PISA and TIMSS points to substantial deficiencies in the education sector that also reflect the deep urban-rural divide and social inequalities. Higher education has been to a great extent converted from a public good into a commodity accessible only for those who can afford it. The problem of quality education is linked to the excessive number of teachers from pre-school to secondary level teaching fewer than the OECD average number of hours, being less qualified for the requirements of modern education than teachers in OECD countries, and, in most cases, underpaid among the lowest paid in the public sector. However, salaries represent almost 75-80 of the budget assigned to education, leaving little space for curriculum improvement, teacher training, grants for research and development or scholarships. The government is currently trying to address the need for improvements in teacher training and remuneration. One success is the de-politicization of schools in comparison to the previous government, under which teacher trade union activists were discriminated against. Overall, self-organization among teachers is low and they are not actively involved in social reform, which has limited the impact of all reform efforts since 2004. In higher education, Georgia joined the Bologna Process in 2005 and successfully eradicated corruption for university entrance exams by implementing a system of national exams. However, this has also generated a demand for fee-based private instruction for young people preparing for these exams. With little internationalization and extremely little money available for research funds, human resources are not adequately renewed so as to contribute to the elaboration of programs and curricula that would be more closely tied to the demands on the labor market. Only very late in 2009, the government realized the importance of reforming the vocational education and training (VET) sector, which, under the new government, received increased funding. However, the contribution of the VET system to overcoming the skills mismatch on the job market is still very limited. As in the whole field of education, reforms in this sector will take a while to create the intended impact. The stigmatized perception of vocational education has also contributed to its negligence. Informal as well as continuous education opportunities are marginalized in the education sector, although Georgia has adopted Lifelong Learning Policies and Strategies. Overall, it seems that quality standards in education can only be achieved with the active involvement of employers and employees representative organizations. Transformation Management I. Level of Difficulty Structural constraints 7 Georgia is still suffering from its deep decline in socioeconomic development after the demise of the Soviet Union. Violent conflicts, economic decline and the loss of the state monopoly on legitimate power led to an immense outflow of capable people during the 1990s. Those societal actors who create change were mainly missing and the overall level of education seriously deteriorated. Thus, the group of political reformers under Saakashvili which came to power in 2004 did not have a broader organized base in society. While being successful in some of their state-building efforts, establishing formal procedures and rules that are accepted and adhered to by the majority of society remain problematic in Georgias socially segregated society, where members of the small group of elites know each other personally. Qualitative changes appeared difficult to achieve in a political culture built around personal loyalty, tactical rapprochements and confrontation instead of a broader consent over long-term strategic development goals. Certainly, the overall limited resources of people, finances and capacities available, and the path dependence on Soviet governance style and overall political culture constantly impede substantial reforms that limit privileged access to resources to the few in favor of increased participation of the broader population organized in different kinds of interest groups, often replacing change with only superficial window dressing. While Saakashvilis reforms succeeded in undermining the overall prevalence of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, the education system, health care, law enforcement and the judiciary, the reliance on informality did not disappear. Informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets, or as doors to building a career. Having an important geopolitical position as a transport and transit corridor between the Black and Caspian Seas, as well as between Russia, Turkey and Iran gives Georgia a special potential role in international affairs of the region. However, the civil war with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was instrumentalized by the Russian leadership to prevent Georgia from joining NATO and associate closely with the European Union. Such a pro-Western orientation is one of the few shared axioms of Georgian society that is supposed to provide more security from its increasingly estranged neighbor Russia. Georgia enjoys fairly good and pragmatic relations with its other immediate neighbors, but its relations with Russia remain one of the biggest security threats overshadowing Georgias development path. Civil society traditions 6 In Georgia, civil society organizations emerged and became active only during the late perestroika period of the Soviet Union as a part of the national movement challenging the Communist Party. During the 1990s, non-governmental organizations managed to survive only thanks to international donor grants, though this fact had mixed impact on their effectiveness and legitimacy among the broader population. Through access to donor funding CSOs provided political activists a niche for their economic survival. Over the years, civil society managed to emerge as an important and influential factor in pushing for constructive and principled change in the political culture, including the moral atmosphere conducive to the peaceful change of power after the parliamentary elections in 2012. On 12 December 2013, the Georgian parliament acknowledged the important role of CSOs in concluding a memorandum with the civil organizations, and established a new tradition of cooperation. Thanks to relatively greater freedom in comparison to most other post-Soviet countries, several capital-based NGOs developed into serious watchdog organizations challenging governments and politicians. However, although increased NGO activity is observable now also in the rural areas, most of these lack a broader membership base. Trade unions represent one of the few exceptions with several thousand members, but their influence is limited. The majority of the impoverished and disenfranchised population is turning towards the Orthodox Church of Georgia for orientation, and to social networks or friends for assistance in need. The emergence of an elitist NGO sector focused on professional consulting and service provision is to a great extent disconnected from the broader society. Those NGOs are still vulnerable to allegations as grant eaters or as politically biased, as happened at the end of 2014. Among the younger generation, students civic activity has become more common. Conflict intensity 5 Persistent social, ethnic and religious cleavages in a country without a tradition of consensus-building through open and transparent dialogue over disputed issues or interests can lead to a confrontation over personalized issues. However, the experience of extreme violence in the early 1990s with paramilitary groups taking over the state and making it a hostage to their particular interests led to caution in escalating conflicts. However, there still are some earlier cases of violence, as mass protests were roughly dispersed by the police in November 2007 and May 2010, the Russo-Georgian War took place in August 2008, and torture became routine in prisons under the Saakashvili regime. Since the change in government in October 2012, there have still been several incidents of smaller violent clashes between the followers of Saakashvili and his contenders from the Georgian Dream, against gay activists, or between the Orthodox majority and the Muslim minority. The state authorities still need to learn how to handle such conflicts in an impartial way, as in the most notorious case of an anti-homophobic rally that was held in Tbilisi on 17 May 2013, the International Day Against Homophobia, during which gay rights activists were violently harassed by thousands of protesters opposing homosexuality who managed to break through a police cordon. II. Management Performance 14 Steering Capability The billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili united the Georgian Dream coalition in its intention to oust President Saakashvili and his United National Movement from power. In its election platform the coalition promised to do a lot of things differently, but any coherent strategy or program was missing. The lack of strategic vision in publicly accessible strategy documents, along with the lack of clearly formulated agendas on the part of almost every political force, is a major drawback. Whenever such documents exist, their function is more closely related to public relations objectives than to an operational plan, and the lack of a realistic implementation agenda remains the main problem even when such documents read well. Even when strategic priorities are set, these may haphazardly change or not be followed in a consistent manner, due to a good deal of voluntarism and unpredictability at the top level of governance. The lack of strategic thinking emerges partly from the legacy of an outdated political tradition, and partly from a weakness in institutional incentives to think and plan strategically. That weakness, in turn, is related to decision-making by a small circle of people in political leadership reluctant to involve independent experts or to consult with the population and civil society. There is also lack of institutionalized channels through which policies can be publicly negotiated, mixed with the tradition of imitating democratic institutions and procedures, which leads to disinterest in the content of any policy debate unless politically relevant, and to widespread populism. Only at an early stage after coming to power, the new government consulted broadly on the revision of the deregulated labor code. Some attempts were made toward inclusive strategy elaboration in the case of less influential ministries like those of sports and youth affairs, or of culture and monument protection. However, it was in the field of culture that the scandal emerged around the destruction of the presumably 5,000 year-old Sakdrisi gold mine that fell victim to a mining companys commercial interests. So far, the new government has not demonstrated any serious will to look for participatory mechanisms aimed at resolving such conflicts. With the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) between Georgia and the EU on 27 June 2014, Georgia has once more underscored its goal of approximation and full integration into the EU. The AA is supposed to provide the master plan for all future reforms. But the question remains as to how implement the European values of democracy, good governance, rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms into everyday practice. Over two decades, three different governments have introduced a number of reforms, modernized financial and public institutions, initiated the harmonization of Georgian legislation with EU regulations, and made considerable progress in the fight against corruption. However, there exists an operational gap in proper implementation of these reforms. Frequently delayed introduction or enactment of important legislative amendments has become one of the negative traits of the Georgian Dream government, which has prevented the formation of a stable and predictable legal environment in the country. At the end of 2014, the deadlines for enacting 10 promised key reforms were delayed for a year. General promises are often offered, instead of dealing with the lack of a common strategic vision by a rather diverse leadership, regarding how to achieve its claimed objectives in a consistent way. Numerous strategic documents were drafted to appeal to international donors, while their implementation proved neither straightforward nor consistent nor successful. The governments promises included eradicating poverty, developing agriculture, resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and joining NATO and the European Union. In general, all of Georgias administrations have struggled to develop strategic plans and to implement existing plans. Obviously, this problem has not disappeared with the new government, whose officials often lack professional expertise, managerial skills and clear leadership from the prime ministers office. Frequent staff rotation, lack of institutional memory and of horizontal coordination among different, related state agencies, as well as profound deficiency in policy formulation and implementation capacities still persist. Policy learning 6 Policy learning has been imperiled for quite some time by the deep divisions in Georgian politics. The relationship between the parties supporting the government and the UNM opposition remains confrontational and counterproductive. Only in rare cases do both political camps succeed in bridging their considerable differences. For example, on March 7, 2013, the parliament adopted a jointly drafted resolution reiterating Georgias commitment to its pro-Western foreign policy course. Overall, parties stand only on very narrow programmatic bases with little interaction and legitimation by their membership. On the positive side, after the 2012 parliamentary elections, cooperation between the new government and civil society organizations improved considerably and the practice of repression and intimidation of the opposition was discarded however, recently, legitimate criticism by leading watchdog NGOs against the governments legal initiatives strengthening surveillance has been rejected by the authorities as politically biased. And another negative example: After the 2012 elections, the Georgian Dream coalition continued the bad practice of the preceding Shevardnadze and Saakashvili administrations with regard to excessively frequent rotation of government positions, disguised by declared intentions of capacity-building and de-politicization of the state institutions. However, developing a stable and meritocratic civil service assisting political office holders in professional decision-making or policy formulation is still to come. 15 Resource Efficiency Efficient use of assets 6 The rotation or replacement of non-performing members continued under the new government, although in some cases the decisions had political or personal overtones, and do not seem to be motivated by any long-term strategy aimed at efficient management of resources. Still, whimsical nominations to high government positions based on personal favoritism common under Saakashvili were replaced for the sake of more rational and efficient management of human resources, although this has not always led to more competent appointments. Civil service reform that should provide security to professionals is still under preparation. So is decentralization of governance and devolution of decision-making and financing authority to the local level. These processes are restricted by a serious deficit of capable human resources in rural areas. At the level of local authorities, a selection process was conducted aimed at replacing political appointments with more professional staff. The most competent candidate has not always been selected, as NGOs monitoring the process discovered. Controversial appointments continued to occur with the new government. Consequently, the minister of energy and vice prime minister is a well-known footballer, but hardly an expert on energy-related issues the prime minister, formerly the managing director of Ivanishvilis Cartu Foundation, became minister of interior, was handpicked for this highest governmental position by the billionaire, who left after one year in office. There are allegations that Ivanishvili is using his personal authority to influence governmental decision-making from behind the scenes. The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information, proactively working on the provision of public information, repeatedly detected that leading state officials self-allocated premiums often greatly exceeded their impressive salaries. Such practices continue to undermine public trust in the governments commitment to sound and consistent reforms. On the positive side, internal control mechanisms, like the State Audit Office, improved performance in identifying misuse or ineffective use of state funds by public employees in office. Only in 2013, the State Audit Office conducted 95 financial and performance audits at different public entities covering the performance period from 2004 to 2013. In-depth audits of some of these institutions had never been attempted before. The findings by the State Audit Office point to essential shortcomings ignored by government or state agencies over the years, due to both mismanagement and a lack of parliamentary oversight. This had resulted in wasteful and undocumented spending of millions of Lari in public funds, which posed serious risks of corruption. Policy coordination 7 Since the parliamentary elections of October 2012, policy coordination has not represented the strongest suite of the diverse members of the Georgian Dream coalition, which was united under the single goal of ousting then-President Saakashvili. They inherited a state apparatus that had developed certain steering capacities, even if previously these were mainly used to implement the decisions of the power circle around Saakashvili. Ministries no longer function as shields for influential circles of economic actors, and policy has gained coherence. Ample space, however, remains even now for improvement with regard to horizontal inter-agency coordination. Vertical interference by the president or prime minister represented the single most important means of ensuring cooperation between different parts of the administration. Ideally, the government should be guided by its revised program, For Strong, Democratic and Unified Georgia, adopted on 26 July 2014. However, while observing disputed cases like the destruction of the ancient Sakdrisi gold mine or the revision and implementation of the Labor Code, it has become clear that, in the presence of strong economic interests, there are no transparent procedures to accommodate opposing interests along balanced policy principles. Anti-corruption policy 7 The Georgian Dream government set out to fight the elite corruption of the previous government, which had set up privileged conditions for individual companies (having political connections) in the market. On 21 March 2014, the parliament of Georgia adopted its On the Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Free Trade and Competition-law, which was developed as a part of anti-monopoly reform to improve the institutional framework of businesses by promoting free competition and developing competitive market as a prerequisite for joining the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. In order to assure its proper implementation, the Competition Agency was established to exercise effective state supervision over a free, fair and competitive environment in the market by preventing the abuse of dominant positions by any economic agent, by supporting small and medium businesses, and by reacting rapidly to violations of the legislation regulating free competition. However, given the past experience of selective justice cases, it remains to be seen how impartially the new agency will operate. The State Audit Office of Georgia (SAOG) is the office of the auditor general and the primary auditing body. Open access to declaration forms and legislation, as well as a hotline number, are provided on the offices website. According to Freedom Houses Nations in Transit Georgia 2013, the SAOG is provided with broad powers to monitor political finances and seize assets or fine any group or organization in violation of Georgias campaign finance regulations. So far, auditing activities mainly covered periods before the new Georgian Dream coalition was in power, and SAOGs impartiality regarding later developments remains to be observed. The Inter-Agency Anti-Corruption Coordination Council represents the other important institution created on the basis of the law on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public Service. Its functions include: coordination of anticorruption activities in the country, updating the anti-corruption action plan and strategy, as well as supervision of their implementation, monitoring accountability towards international organizations, initiation of relevant legislative activities, and drafting recommendations by its nine thematic groups. The council is also following on Georgias implementation of the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Based on an official decree about the necessary measures for the implementation of the action plan of Georgia for the Open Government Partnership, starting from July 2013, government institutions are obliged to make public key operational information. The implementation of a National Action Plan of 2014-2015 (NAP) jointly elaborated by the government, civil society, as well as in consultations with the public will be monitored by the government. Relevant reports will be regularly prepared by the Inter-Agency Anti-Corruption Coordination Council. These institutional mechanisms do not fully prevent cases of nepotism and cronyism, but do provide ground for making such cases public and putting pressure on the government. 16 Consensus-Building Consensus on goals 7 With the signing of the Association Agreement between Georgia and the EU on 27 June 2014, the country committed itself voluntarily to conducting serious reforms in further aligning itself with EU standards. The Association Agreement was essentially prepared under the UNM government and finalized by the Georgian Dream coalition. Among the political elites, there is a broad consensus on Western integration, although, while UNM was more in accord with neoliberal approaches favored by Republican administrations in the U. S. Georgian Dream seems to prefer the approaches prevalent in the EU. Another dividing line between the two political forces is policy towards Russia, in which case the UNM accuses Georgian Dream of a pro-Russian stance and too conciliatory an approach in addressing Georgias separatist conflicts. Beyond the basics, there is likewise little unity within the ruling coalition. After the arrest of top staff members from the Ministry of Defense for corruption, Minister Irakli Alasania, leader of the Free Democrats Party, was sacked by the Prime Minister for his public criticism of this action. As a consequence, the Free Democrats Party quit the coalition and went into opposition, while some members of the party left the government and the majority faction in the parliament, accusing Georgian Dream of deviation from a consistent pro-Western policy. Parliament Speaker, Davit Usupashvili, denounced, on behalf of his Republican Party, another member of the ruling coalition, the allegations about Georgias Euro-Atlantic course being under threat as groundless, and announced that his party will not leave the coalition. However, Republicans frequently criticize decisions supported by the majority of the Georgian Dream, and are expected to further dissent in the future. This, once again, demonstrates that there is no detailed strategic and value-based vision around which the coalition can be united. Instead, it is kept together by political circumstances and the fact of being in power.16.1While there is general agreement regarding the basic principles of the market economy, there is hardly any consensus on common policy goals within the rather diverse coalition of political parties that make Georgian Dream. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinions are more often voiced with regards to political issues, and rarely relate to strategic decisions in the economic sphere promoted by the government the parliament more often simply rubber-stamping government initiatives. Anti-democratic actors 7 Although the National Movement under former President Saakashvili prioritized state-building over democratization, it acknowledged its defeat in the parliamentary elections of October 2012. The Georgian Dream coalition set itself the task of depoliticizing state institutions. The legacy of human rights violations by the previous government created a segment in society that demands revenge or justice against UNM members previously in power. The Alliance of Patriots (AOP) managed to unite some such people. AOP was also in favor of delaying signing of the AA with the EU, and considers Georgias NATO aspirations fruitless. It came in fourth in last years local elections by garnering just under 5 of the vote. Although this group cannot be called explicitly anti-democratic, it argues that the new government did not take sufficient legal measures against the alleged UNM perpetrators, in contrast with the position promoted by the majority of Georgias Western partners. Other anti-democratic actors resemble political entrepreneurs, acting on behalf of some bigger business interests. Another influential factor is the rather conservative Orthodox Church of Georgia, one of Georgias least transparent institutions, but with very high public trust rates mainly due to public respect of the person of Patriarch Ilia II. As disappointment grows because living conditions for the population are not improving, more support for antidemocratic forces can be expected. According to an IRI survey from February 2015, if people had to choose, only 38 opted for a democratic system of government while 50 wanted a prosperous economy. However, support for joining the EU (85) and NATO (78) remains high. Cleavage / conflict management 6 The capabilities of political elites related to conflict management remain to a great extent underdeveloped. No substantial progress has been achieved with regard to reconciliation with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, widely perceived as instruments of Russian geopolitical manipulation. The initial progress achieved in civic integration of ethnic and religious minority groups is hindered by insufficient enforcement of essential constitutional rights for some religious and sexual minorities. The polarization between Georgian Dream and United National Movement continues. There is an insufficient tradition and culture of dialogue and negotiation, and reform-oriented forces have not been able to institutionalize effective conflict-resolution and mitigation mechanisms. Institutionalized forms of consent-building and legitimizing procedures are still more the exception than the rule, also because the majority of the population, due to dire socioeconomic conditions, are reluctant to participate in the political field as active citizens, or are prone to become victims of populist rhetoric, which often exploits existing tensions and conflicts. Civil society participation 6 After Saakashvilis defeat in the parliamentary elections, the once-vibrant NGO sector returned as an active interlocutor with the government in several important civil rights reform fields. Cooperation between the new government and civil society organizations on issues such as the new labor law, the state budget or local administration reform has become more productive. These NGOs continued to be an important pool for the recruitment of government personnel, as well as a field of activity for former politicians creating new NGOs critical of the current government. The new authorities responded to concerns raised by some leading watchdog organizations with regard to correcting authoritarian trends in constitutional amendments, bureaucratic harassment of independent media outlets and businesses, and human rights violations. NGOs have participated in the policy process when their capabilities and know-how were needed. The parliament even concluded a memorandum of understanding, acknowledging the special role of civil society organizations in the legislative process and in monitoring the proper implementation of the laws. However, due to the fact that the NGOs do not sufficiently represent broader parts of society, and often follow an agenda not aligned with the needs of the population, CSOs do not enjoy much trust in society (e. g. in comparison with the church, army or patrol police, or recently, the media). Under the new government, leading NGOs fulfill some control functions normally exercised by political opposition. Trade unions and professional associations have developed slowly, being concentrated mainly in the capital and bigger urban centers. In rural and mountainous areas, the few existing NGOs are still very weak and have only very limited influence on local affairs. However, there have also been some threats voiced against NGOs. In May 2014, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili slammed NGOs united in the This Affects You coalition, a group campaigning against the governments unfettered access to telecom operators networks, saying that they damage Georgias international reputation and undermine the countrys security. Previously, in a joint statement on 2 February 2014, 46 non-governmental organizations condemned ex-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvilis remarks in which he stated that he is looking into the activities of several civil society activists considered to be threatening. Possibilities for reconciliation with the separatist Abkhazian authorities deteriorated further with Abkhazias conclusion of a treaty of alliance and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation in December 2014. A similar treaty was signed on 18 March 2015 between Russia and South Ossetias de facto authorities. These acts to some extent are seen as a Russian reaction to the conclusion by Georgia of the Association Agreement with the EU. State Minister of Reconciliation and Civic Equity Paata Zakareishvili has very little to offer the secessionist entities other than to become more self-reflective on the origins of the conflicts and Tbilisis mistakes. There are only few government-led confidence building measures toward Abkhazians and South Ossetians, focused mainly on the provision of medical aid. The status neutral personal travel documents offered by Tbilisi were rejected by both Abkhazians and Ossetians, since they had to be issued by Georgian authorities. The many cases of selective justice, arrests of political opponents and businessmen, or extortions from small - and medium-scale enterprises by state officials during the Saakashvili administration have created a deep split in society. After the new government took office, demands proliferated for re-establishing justice, which would include prosecuting previous government officials for having misused their position for their own advantages or political interest. At the same time, international pressure on the new government to not practice selective revenge justice is also very high. As many persons accused of misdeeds remain in office, there is a widespread conviction that a thorough reappraisal of the past would require more than merely juridical measures. However, suggestions that truth and reconciliation commissions be composed of prominent members of civil society have not been brought to realization. The ongoing revision of the National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration could offer still another approach towards a broader reconciliation process in Georgia. 17 International Cooperation Effective use of support 7 As in previous years, Georgia has continued to receive massive financial aid from multilateral and bilateral donors with the bulk of financial assistance spent on infrastructure projects like the rehabilitation of roads, water pipelines, irrigation systems and the electricity sector, as well as on credits to small and medium-sized enterprises. While some of these projects were considered successful, donor-driven efforts to create a professional civil service are still under way. Critics claim that, under the Saakashvili administration, aid money was not always spent in ways that helped strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Ownership of cooperation programs was varying in accordance to political convictions, which was sometimes expressed in drastic policy shifts. Donor coordination remained weak. The new government should coordinate international assistance according to its development strategy Georgia 2020, which lacks clearly formulated indicators. The Association Agreement concluded with the EU is accompanied by the Association Agenda, which for the first years will steer the implementation of Georgias commitments towards EU principles and standards. The agenda provides for an explicitly formulated long-term development strategy and requires it to be consistently implemented. One of the major donors is the European Union, supporting Georgias approximation process under its European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020 with 610-746 million for reforms of public administration, agriculture and rural development and justice, while providing complementary support for capacity development and civil society. The other important donor is the U. S. government, whose focus is on building democracy, promoting regional stability, and fostering economic growth and health services. In the next four years, USAID aims to promote attitudes and values that encourage citizens to be responsible and accountable for their country. USAIDs four long-term objectives are economic growth, energy sector reform, democracy and governance, and social and health services development. The fact that, prior to the October 2012 change of government, important administrative decisions were usually taken by a small circle of insiders with no inclusion of the persons affected by these decisions was felt to be a major problem that seriously compromised the governments credibility as well as its commitment to implementing serious reforms and establishing transparent and democratic practices of governance. The new Georgian authorities stopped criticizing donor organizations for being too bureaucratic, and the overall balance of the cooperation between Georgia and the international donor community remains good. The commitment to achieving sustainable results through cooperation even increased, e. g. in the framework of the Association Agreement. Georgian society supports the course of orienting the country toward the integration into European Union and NATO structures. A vast majority of respondents consider EU support to be very important for Georgia, and 80 favor EU membership. However, aspirations for EU and NATO membership are often seen unrealistically as the solution for all social and economic problems of the country. Unrealistic expectations seem to lie in the tradition of patrimonial relationship with leading figures, when loyalty is provided on the condition of delivery of material improvements. Thus, Mikheil Saakashvili, as well as billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, can be blamed for having raised such unrealistic expectations in the population in order to legitimize their aspirations for power. However, they cannot create employment, but only the necessary environment. Only business can create jobs, which require entrepreneurial skills and affordable loans for start-ups. Regional cooperation 8 Due to past experiences of threat perception and conflict, Georgian foreign policy has been focused primarily on the closely interconnected issues of handling strained relations with Russia and gaining admission to NATO. However, admission to NATO is no longer a realistic short-term goal and has been moved somewhat to the periphery of the foreign policy agenda since the 2008 war. Regional cooperation, which is also fostered in the framework of the EU Neighborhood Policy, has continued to be of some importance. Relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia are basically good and not much influenced by conflicts. The idea of becoming a transportation and energy corridor in the region is still relevant, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (Turkey) railway is expected to be finished by the second half of 2015. The railway is being built to create an energy corridor by rail for cargo mainly from Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. In addition to that, current cargo traffic from Turkey to CIS countries may shift to this new route. The new government attempted to improve its relations with Russia and regained access to the Russian market for Georgian products, such as wine and mineral water, in 2013. The Georgian prime ministers special envoy Zurab Abashidze conducts talks with Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gregory Karasyn on the condition that official recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states by Russia is excluded from the dialogue. However, lately, relations between the Georgian Dream government and Russia have become more strained due to the agreements concluded by Moscow with Sukhum(i) and Tskhinval(i), against the background of the undeclared hybrid war in Ukraine. The visa-free regime for Russian citizens is still in force, but traveling to Russia remains difficult and cumbersome for Georgian citizens, as visa requirements are strict. Strategic Outlook During the 24 years of Georgias transformation process, changes in power have been provoked variously by putsches, demonstrations or impeachments. Besides his increasingly authoritarian leadership style, former President Saakashvili also set a positive precedent in acknowledging defeat in parliamentary elections, which may contribute to the consolidation of democratic institutions in Georgia. Georgia needs to take further steps toward the development of a democratic system of horizontal accountability, establishing a set of checks and balances through institutions of comparable strength, which continuously oversee each other. The Georgian judiciary and parliament have a particularly important role to play in the development of such a system. The parliament of Georgia needs to pay closer attention to the audit findings of the State Audit Office and assume a more responsible oversight role. The extent to which it succeeds in doing this will determine whether Georgia can finally establish a working and transparent system of checks and balances, promote good governance, limit the scope for abuse of power, and make further progress in the fight against corruption. Overall, the Georgian state should strive to involve civil society and business more systematically and ensure that they are properly involved in the law-making process. Such participation could promote dialogue at the political level in order to ensure a proper implementation of legislation and coordination among relevant authorities. Civil society organizations themselves should improve their limited outreach toward the broader population. The government needs to develop and explicitly formulate a strategic vision with clear policies to increase and diversify the countrys industrial base with a focus on small and medium enterprises, putting into due use the countrys main capital human resources and cultural heritage. This could help commercial banks better assess the future direction of development and increase private lending, as well as sustainable employment. However, this requires a serious effort and increased investment in quality education, especially in entrepreneurial skills and the populations financial literacy. A well-designed policy mix, aimed at increasing financial literacy and informational transparency, could significantly improve the growth prospects for the Georgian economy. To overcome Georgias weak economy the DCFTA between Georgia and the EU is a challenge and an opportunity at the same time. It is a vital trade instrument for building long-term economic relationships. In order for DCFTA to fulfill its potential, Georgia will need the EUs increased support with a view to facilitating legal approximation and its effective implementation. Georgia should prioritize those spheres and degrees of approximation which are most relevant from a development point of view. When prioritizing harmonization, the EU should tailor its recommendations to Georgias needs and socioeconomic situation, e. g. public demand for employment and mitigating the negative effects of approximation. Besides economic development, Georgia should develop effective implementation mechanisms also for reforms in improving the justice sector, to preventing it from being subject to accusations of political bias. To make effective use of international assistance, the government should establish a functioning donor coordination mechanism in line with its Georgia 2020 development strategy. The broad approval rate for EU approximation and integration into Western structures provides the basis for serious reforms of the state and society, which needs to accept that pluralism does not represent a threat to national identity. On the contrary, pluralism may strengthen the moral basis that allows for resolving conflicting interests in an institutionalized, inclusive and transparent way. This possibly represents the biggest challenge of qualitative change for the country. Georgia Country ReportExecutive Summary With the first peaceful transfer of power in the highly competitive parliamentary elections of October 2012, after one year of cohabitation and another year of unchallenged rule of the Georgian Dream coalition, high expectations of socioeconomic improvements and justice yielded disappointment among the population. The economy did not really improve. On the contrary, it contracted and did not provide an expected increase in employment. The new government tried to depoliticize the public sector and to achieve justice. It released prisoners and summoned former officials from the new opposition, the United National Movement (UNM). Political motivation for bringing them to court cannot be denied. Nor can the violations of fundamental human rights during UNMs own reign. More than ever, Georgia is desperately in need of common ground with inclusive and transparent state institutions, an empowered civil society and a much more educated population able to provide homegrown entrepreneurship to increase the economic output and create employment with the help of foreign investments. Further integration with Western structures, mainly the EU and NATO, requires serious reforms, the positive, as well as negative, implications of which need to be openly addressed. At the same time, public debate needs to be institutionalized. History and Characteristics of Transformation A series of dramatic ups and downs have characterized Georgias political and economic transformation. The development of the country, which from the outset was hampered by the heavy burden of two unresolved ethnic conflicts and a sharp economic decline, could roughly be divided into six phases. The first phase was marked by Georgias first breakthrough to a democratic political regime, the parliamentary elections of October 1990. The election brought to power a heterogeneous umbrella movement under the leadership of former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Despite his landslide victory in the May 1991 presidential elections, Gamsakhurdia failed to consolidate his rule, which mainly rested on his ability to mobilize using charisma. As a result, he was easily driven out of office by a violent coup dtat in 1992. The second phase, dominated by the return of former Georgia Communist Party head Eduard Shevardnadze, began with a brief interlude of chaos following Gamsakhurdias ousting. During the first three years of his rule, Shevardnadze tried to get rid of the competing gangs of criminals that had run havoc in the country and originally supported his return. The adoption of a constitution and the successful organization of elections signaled a fragile consolidation of power. Notwithstanding quite impressive achievements in terms of ending violence and introducing the formal requisites of democratic statehood, and despite massive international assistance, Shevardnadze ultimately did not succeed in stable governance. The only continuous feature was clear dominance by the executive. In contrast, the shape of the parliament was adapted to varying needs. Until 1995, the abolishment of any kind of electoral threshold ensured a highly fragmented legislature. After the creation of the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) in 1993, which was designed to serve as Shevardnadzes party of power, the introduction of an electoral threshold resulted in a stable majority for the CUG. Pluralism was mainly confined to intra-elite competition within the ruling party, which was composed of former Soviet apparatchiks and a group of young reformers. In the third phase, beginning in 2001, the distribution of official fiefdoms among the different cliques of the elite severely hampered economic growth and gave rise to popular unrest. Confronted with a decline in its authority, the ruling party adopted authoritarian measures, a move that provoked an internal split. Prominent representatives of the wing of young reformers inside CUG, headed by Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, formed a new opposition that assumed power in the aftermath of popular protests against the rigging of parliamentary elections in November 2003. The relative ease with which Shevardnadze was overthrown during what was to be called the Rose Revolution can be explained partly by the existence of democratic facades erected under his rule, fomented by a dense network of NGOs and independent media outlets. In the fourth phase, which followed the peaceful revolution, the victorious triumvirate of Saakashvili, Burjanadze and Zhvania rushed to stabilize the situation. In a wise move, they joined together to create a new party named the United National Movement (UNM). Supported by more than 96 of the popular vote, the charismatic leader Saakashvili seized an overwhelming victory in the presidential elections of January 2004. The newly created party won more than two-thirds of the seats in the March 2004 parliamentary elections. Control over the executive and legislative branch of the government made implementing a far-reaching structural reform agenda possible. As a result, the government achieved outstanding results in terms of curbing corruption, streamlining an inefficient administration, improving tax collection and providing public goods for an economy that underwent a significant upsurge. Despite these impressive results, critics of the new elite pointed to serious deficits and even setbacks in terms of institutionalizing checks and balances. This concerned the parliament, as much as the judiciarys independence and the media. The fifth phase, beginning in the fall of 2007, was marked by the governments violent response to demonstrations, violence that seriously undermined Saakashvilis democratic credentials. Growing authoritarian tendencies, as well as the inability of the ruling elite to translate dynamic economic growth into tangibly improved living standards for a majority of impoverished citizens, gave rise to a series of popular protests while feeding the momentum behind deep political polarization. A significant slowdown of economic growthcaused not only by the global financial crisis, but rather by a serious deterioration in the overall investment climate in the aftermath of the war against Russia in 2008further undermined stability. The sixth phase started with the defeat of the ruling UNM by the opposition coalition Georgian Dream (GD) in the highly competitive parliamentary elections of October 2012. Initially this led for one year to cohabitation with President Saakashvili during which tensions prevailed. Several former ministers and prominent UNM leaders were arrested or summoned to court in an attempt to hold them responsible for numerous human rights violations. However, how the government coped with this legacy caused international concern and accusations of selectively applying justice. The presidential elections on 27 October 2013, despite some irregularities in the vote count and isolated incidents of political violence, were considered free and fair, and resulted in a straight victory for the GD candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, with over 62 of votes, which further consolidated GDs power. The party is now formally in charge of both the presidency and the government and has a majority in parliament. However, Margvelashvili is not a member of any political party, and there are rising tensions between him and Prime Minister Gharibashvili. Finally, the municipal elections in June 2014 completed the democratic transfer of power from UNM to GD at all levels. No less important, for the first time, the former ruling party managed to survive its loss of power intact and formed an opposition faction in parliament. Giorgi Margvelashvilis inauguration on 17 November 2013 marked the entry into force of constitutional changes adopted under the previous leadership that mark a shift from a presidential to a mixed system, significantly diminishing the presidents powers. Bidzina Ivanishvili, who left the office of the prime minister voluntarily in November 2013, introduced Irakli Garibashvili as his successor. The latter assumed the constitutionally most powerful office of prime minister since independence, confirmed by the GD-dominated parliament. In 2014, Georgia was relatively calm, besides the fact that the Ukraine crisis resonated there. The GD Coalition experienced its first serious crack with Irakli Alasanias dismissal from the post of defense minister in November and the subsequent withdrawal of the Free Democrats from the coalition. However, the publics appraisal of the GD coalitions performance has decreased in 2014, primarily due to a lack of socioeconomic improvements. The year 2013 turned out to be a transition period, with weak economic activity during the first half, characterized by slower private investment, weak credit growth and budget underspending. Thus, the government had to revise its growth target downwards from 6 to 2.5 at the end of 2013. In 2014, a GDP growth of 4.8 was recorded, and in 2015, only 2 growth is expected. While tackling unemployment is the number one issue among the population, there has been little improvement in this regard. The most important foreign policy event in recent times is the conclusion of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement on 27 June 2014. It contains serious reform commitments on the part of Georgia in exchange for visa regime liberalization and access to the EUs internal market through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and demonstrates Georgias intention to move closer to the European Union. The BTI combines text analysis and numerical assessments. The score for each question is provided below its respective title. The scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). Transformation Status 7 Organization of the Market and Competition Market-based competition 6 The legal and institutional framework for a market economy created by the previous government since 2004 continued to be an important factor in stabilizing Georgias economy. However, it turned out to be somewhat hollow in practice. After the change in government, past violations of property rights and formal and informal interventions by state authorities in private businesses became topics of public debate. The Georgian Dream coalition set out to depoliticize business and reinstate property rights. However, there have been new complaints (e. g. by TI Georgia) that the last two years have been marked by artificial obstacles and gratuitous regulations delivering negative messages to investors. So, at the end of 2014, the time limits for enacting 10 key reforms were postponed for a year. Another cause of concern is the new Law on the Legal Status of Aliens and Stateless Persons, drafted by the Ministry of Justice, which entered into effect on 1 September 2014 and tightened regulations on temporary residence in Georgia. The prohibition on the sale of agricultural land to foreigners, new postal service regulations, a prolonged process of reforming the Labor Code or new labor migration regulations provoked foreign businessmen, in particular, to seek recourse from the courts, often with success. No cases of administered pricing were reported. A World Bank study in 2013 found that, in 2008, 30.1 of GDP was produced in the informal sector with very little or no competition. At the same time, in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, Georgia further advanced to 69th position (over previous years: 2013-2014, 72nd 2012-2013, 77th and 2011-2012: 88th) and was characterized as an efficiency driven economy. The main contributors to this improvement are the macroeconomic environment (although marked by significant volatility), financial market development and goods market efficiency. The areas that mostly worsened are health and primary education. An inadequately educated workforce (20.2) and lack of access to financing (18.8) represent the major obstacles to doing business, followed by inadequate supply of infrastructure (10.4), poor work ethic in the national labor force (9.0) and insufficient capacity to innovate (8.3). The Association Agreement, including the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), concluded between the EU and Georgia on 27 June 2014, will fundamentally change business. These changes are focused on the alignment of the domestic business environment with that of the EU. While this will contribute to the economic sustainability in the long run, it creates additional costs and requires serious reform efforts in the coming years. Anti-monopoly policy 6 Georgias presumably highly liberalized economy with only few formal legislative and administrative barriers did not lead, however, to increased competition to the contrary, it enabled some well-established market players to engage in anticompetitive practices and abuse their market power. The new government is trying to regain some lost ground. On 21 March 2014, the Georgian parliament amended the Law on Free Trade and Competition as well as the Georgian Law on State Procurement with a number of important changes in the regulatory framework. It has split the Competition and State Procurement Agency into two independent legal entities: the Competition Agency and the State Procurement Agency. The amendments also foresee stronger safeguards for the Competition Agencys independence and supervisory powers over state interventions that undermine competition, on the one hand. But, on the other hand, they allow economic agents to take their cases over alleged breaches of competition law straight to courts or to challenge the Competition Agencys decisions there. If functioning properly, the agency will ensure that the markets openness and transparency is secured and that the authorities do not impose administrative, legal and discriminatory obstacles for entering the market and illegally restrict competition. The agency will also determine an economic agents market share in the relevant market by applying methodological guidelines of market analysis. The law lists potential cases of abuse of a dominant position, sets criteria for determining group domination in case of several economic agents, defines unfair competition and also describes cases where an economic agent is obliged to notify the agency about concentration. As a result, economic agents will know in advance what types of actions could qualify as unfair competition and can anticipate and avoid such actions in the future. These measures are expected to contribute to curbing the so-called elite corruption, often discussed in Georgia, such as setting privileged conditions in the market for individual companies, mostly those with political ties. Liberalization of foreign trade 9 The foreign trade regime adopted in Georgia remains comparatively liberal. It has only a limited number of customs control institutions, import duties and procedures for customs clearance. Only a very restricted number of goods require licensing for import and export. A number of bilateral agreements with the majority of developed countries have significantly contributed to facilitating access to Georgian goods on international markets. As a result, Georgia managed to further improve its relatively high ranking in the World Banks Trading Across Borders Index from 38th in 2012 to 33rd in 2014. Georgias overall foreign-trade volumes in 2014 were 5 higher than in 2013, according to preliminary data from GeoStat, the National Statistics Department. Exports for 2014 were valued at 2.9 billion, or 2 less than the previous year, while imports totaled 8.6 billion, 7 more than the year before. The trade deficit was 5.7 billion, or approximately 50 of the countrys overall trade volumes. The impact of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Georgia and the EU on Georgias trade balance is to date unclear. The DCFTA differs from other international trade agreements in that it covers not only market access provisions (tariffs, customs and mutual recognition of technical standards), but also aims at harmonizing Georgian national legislation with the EU-Acquis. Banking system 7 Over the last two years, Georgias financial sector has expanded only slightly after a pre-2011 period of rapid growth. Bank operations became an essential part of daily life, though there is still a lot of room for further diversification of banking services. The banking sector operates within an increasingly stable legal framework, as the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) enforces progressive and stringent regulations, including capital and liquidity requirements, on commercial banks. The NBG is gradually introducing reforms to create a more advanced risk-based approach to supervision and to further harmonize its regulations with relevant EU directives and Basel II/III principles. During 2013, there were 21 commercial banks and foreign bank branches operating in Georgia, 20 of which (including two branches of foreign banking institutions) had foreign capital participation. Georgian banking sectors total assets (including both domestic commercial banks and branches of foreign banks in Georgia) was 17.3 billion GEL as of 31 December 2013 (in 2012: 14.4 billion GEL) with the five largest banks accounting for 77.3 of total assets. Georgian banks are prudently capitalized with a capitalization ratio standing at 16.8. Georgias liquidity ratio was up by 1.5 to 37.3 at year-end 2013. The bank capital to assets ratio has decreased from 21.9 in 2004 to 16.6 in 2011, and only slightly increased to 16.8 in 2013. Domestic credits have increased continuously since 2009 from 5.8 billion GEL to 12.4 billion GEL in the third quarter of 2014. Loans in the Georgian banking sector thus increased in 2013 by 21.0 (29.4 in total individual loans, 14.7 in corporate loans). According to World Bank data, in 2012 Georgia had one of the smallest percentages of nonperforming loans among all eastern European countries. However, nonperforming bank loans increased from 3 in 2013 to 3.5 in 2014. The level of domestic savings in Georgia is still quite low relative to the financing needs of the country, even if customer deposits increased by 26.5 to 9.7 billion GEL in 2013 and further to 10.7 billion GEL in the third quarter of 2014 (3.9 billion GEL in 2009). The de-dollarization trend continued in 2013, with foreign currency deposits accounting for 60 of total deposits at the end of 2013 (64 in 2012). NBGs refinancing rate decreased during 2013 to 3.75, compared to 5.25 at the end of 2012, mainly due to its intention to boost lending and economic activities in the country. The low ratio of bank loans to GDP at 39.4 in 2013 demonstrates that Georgias major problem is access to finance. This is grounded in persistent structural obstacles to financial sector development. First of all, the small market size with only limited real sector penetration prevent economies of scale for Georgian banks. Secondly, the moderate country ratings on international markets imply a continued reliance on external sources of funding for commercial banks with a tendency for short-term lending. Thirdly, low financial reporting standards among Georgian companies and low levels of financial literacy among the economically active population prevent proper use of business loans. Finally, long-term lending is done almost exclusively in foreign currencies, which creates a FX credit risk, realized in early 2015 with the dramatic depreciation of the Georgian lari. Thus, the dependency on investments in the Georgian banking industry by international financial institutions continues. 8 Currency and Price Stability Anti-inflation / forex policy 7 After suffering from high inflation in 2011 (8.5), the Georgian economy experienced deflation at -0.9 in 2012 and at -0.5 in 2013. As of January 2015, annual inflation stood at 1.4 again. Thus, the Georgian National Bank increased its key policy rate by 50 basis points to 4.5. The intention was to tighten monetary policy in late January 2015, amid depreciation of Georgias national currency (GEL) against the U. S. dollar, and to neutralize additional inflation risks, which are to a significant degree dependent on exogenous factors. The last time the NBG changed its key rate was in February 2014, when it was increased by 25 basis points to 4. During the period under review, the inflation rate was mainly influenced by price changes in the following groups: food and non-alcoholic beverages (where prices increased by 0.7) and housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (with a price increase of 0.4). In February 2015, ex-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili blamed the National Bank of Georgia and its president, Giorgi Kadagidze, who was appointed to his post under the UNM government, for inaction or incorrect actions in response to the Laris depreciation. These accusations were rejected by the latter. No other attempts at interference from outside in the internal workings of the NBG have so far been reported. Financial volatility is influenced by upward inflationary pressures and reflects a rising domestic demand for imports. As Georgia imports virtually all of its natural gas and oil products, and even essential food products, there is rapid growth of the money supply and an expansion in net foreign assets. In addition, increasing volumes of imports are not matched by a corresponding growth in exports, creating a persistent current accounts deficit. All this makes it difficult for the government to pursue a consistent anti-inflation policy. It is an important challenge for the country to develop a powerful export sector in order to reduce the foreign-trade gap (in 2014 the trade deficit was 5.732 million or 50 of the total turnover). Georgia ranks slightly below the average for post-Soviet Eurasia on macroeconomic stability. While risks to macroeconomic stability lessened in 2012, Georgia continuously performs worse than its peers in terms of poverty and inequality. Due to the political insecurities of the recent transition period, macroeconomic stability has been temporarily disrupted. No decisive increase in exports was recorded, while FDI growth never reached the volume it enjoyed before the war with Russia in 2008. Foreign debt has decreased from 39.3 of GDP in 2010 to 32.2 in 2013. Georgias gross external debt amounted to 13.8 billion, of which the public sector accounted for 31.9 as of 30 September 2012, according to the National Bank of Georgia. As of December 2014, the gross external debt is 13.1 billion. Georgias current account balance was halved to -923.1 million in 2013, up from -1.8507 billion in 2012. The total debt service grew from 1.605 billion in 2011 to 1.779 billion in 2012 and to 1.644 billion in 2013. With increased state expenditures, primarily on social assistance, it is not yet clear how the government will attempt to reduce the deficit. Fiscal consolidation could represent a move forward to a more responsible attitude by the government. Georgia recorded a government budget deficit equal to 2.9 of GDP in 2013 (3.5 in 2012). 9 Private Property Property rights 6 The World Banks Registration of Private Property Index 2014 again ranked Georgia first among the countries surveyed with one procedure within one day. This positive figure is only overshadowed by the increase in cases of violations of private property by affiliates of the previous government. These are pending in court. These cases indicate that amendments to the laws on registration of immovable property, in particular, have closed substantial gaps in the countrys legislation. Improper implementation during Saakashvilis administration revealed severe institutional weaknesses in the judiciary and tax administration agencies. Both are quite vulnerable to executive interference and tend to ignore norms of procedural justice. However, the Georgian Dream coalition has declared its intention to curb the arbitrary disposition of public and private property, reestablish justice in dubious cases, guarantee property rights, and bring more transparency to both past and future transactions. Private enterprise 7 There were serious infringements on property rights before 2012 including abandonment or citizens handing over property to the state as a gift, arbitrary title registration in the name of the state to property already registered by the owners and missing transparency in government launched large-scale privatization programs. The new authorities tried to secure interests in both real and personal property which are recognized and recorded. However, deficiencies in the operation of the court system hampers foreign investors, especially, from realizing their rights to property offered as security. The improvements so far were acknowledged in the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom where Georgias score is 73.0, making its economy the 22nd freest (primarily due to freedom from corruption, monetary freedom and the management of government spending). State companies still remain one of the countrys major employers, where labor conflicts with trade unions have occurred. Under new regulations, the public postal service came into conflict with private providers. Privatizations were conducted mostly by the previous authorities before they left office. Their conformity to the market still needs to be studied. 10 Welfare Regime Social safety nets 5 Recent years have seen significant efforts by the Georgian government to improve the existing welfare regime, which is, however, still far from satisfying basic needs. All social benefits are solely funded out of general taxation. The government provides a range of income support to families and individuals including targeted social assistance (using a proxy means test to identify the poorest households), universal pensions, and categorical benefits, such as IDP and disability allowances. From the poorest 20 of Georgian households, 25 receive cash benefits from the state. Pensions reach 61 of the bottom quintile. However, 28 of the bottom quintile has never applied for assistance, as an UNICEF report detected. When the Georgian Dream coalition entered office, they increased social spending, which accounts for about 35 of the 2015 state budget. As a result, the threshold for getting social assistance has been lowered and support to IDPs and war veterans has been improved. From 1 July 2013, all citizens were entitled to basic health care. Minimum pensions were raised from 100 to 125 GEL in April 2013 and again to 150 GEL (about 90) in September 2013 (with a further rise by GEL 10 due in September 2015). Depending on length of service, a sum of 2-10 GEL is added monthly to that minimum rate. Thus, half of the budget for the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection for 2015 (1.39 billion GEL out of 2.785 billion GEL) or 17.3 of total budget spending is allocated for pensions. The retirement age for women is 60 and 65 for men. In 2013, there were about 694,000 pensioners registered with the Georgian social service agency. The average life expectancy of 74.2 years (males 69.3, females 79.0 years) lies just below the European average of about 75 years. If not seriously addressed by a consistent reform, the costs for pensions in the state budget will explode in coming years. In addition to the need for greater financial support for social programs, greater support for self-help is also needed. Georgian community, governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as international organizations, have demonstrated growing interest in establishing additional social and health-related assistance for citizens. However, until now, all these efforts have done little to significantly reduce overall poverty and vulnerability, which is of a systemic nature. Equal opportunity 6 Georgia is still far from ensuring equal opportunities to all its citizens. Social and economic vulnerability in Georgia is directly coupled with restricted opportunities for some minorities, internally displaced persons (IDPs), people with disabilities and the population living in remote mountainous regions. Significant differences persist between rural and urban areas and between the poorer and the more developed regions of the country in terms of access to infrastructure services. Gender inequality remains an issue of concern, even if there are some improvements. The proportion of women in parliament increased from 6 in 2008 to 11 in 2012. The voluntary gender quota inclusion of women on party lists increased from 20 to 30. For the parties that comply with this provision, more budget funds are allocated. However, the proportion of women in local councils increased only slightly from 11 to 11.8 after the municipal elections in 2014. A Gender Equality National Action Plan for 2014-2016 was adopted to achieve greater gender equality in different areas of political, social and economic life. However, education enrollment rates show no significant difference between female and male students, while in tertiary education there is a higher rate of female students. Gender gaps are more evident in the field of employment, where the prospects for career success and equal remuneration for women remain limited. While unemployment was significantly higher among males (16.5) than females (12.3) as of 2013, according to official statistics, a higher number of women reported as employed appear in reality to be self-employed, a significant proportion of them in agriculture and in petty trade. Although there exists no legal discrimination against ethnic minorities, their representation in state jobs is disproportionately low. This can only in part be explained by the lack of proficiency in the Georgian language a necessary precondition for taking many state jobs as proficiency has increased over the last decade, mainly among the younger generation. The situation of ethnic minorities, particularly in urban areas, has improved as well. However, especially with regard to integration into the educational system and in the labor market, there are still obstacles to overcome that are mainly grounded in public perception and discriminatory hiring practices. One important aspect of social inequality is the stigma carried by representatives of sexual minorities, and also by disabled persons. In the latter case, some initial steps have been taken to integrate the disabled into society, jobs and educational institutions. Still another issue is the frequently expressed, general intolerance toward representatives of non-traditional religious denominations, e. g. Jehovahs Witnesses. A new policy tool for creating better opportunities that has been slowly introduced by the current administration, while fully neglected by the previous government, is employment policy. In order to better coordinate supply and demand on the labor market, vocational training is garnering more attention. The impact of this approach is not yet measurable, as preparation by the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs is ongoing. 11 Economic Performance Output strength 6 After several years of rapid economic growth at an average of 6 annually, Georgias GDP stands now at 16.13 billion and its GDP per capita increased from 922 (2003) to 3,681 (2014). However, its economy has still not reached the GPD level of 1989. Economic growth markedly slowed down in the past two years, which happened largely due to uncertainty after the October 2012 parliamentary elections, low investment and slow budget execution (because the government withheld certain investments from infrastructure development). Only in the quarter after the October 2013 presidential elections did economic growth recover, picking up speed to reach 4.8 in 2014. Remittances from Georgian migrant workers, mainly from Russia, were until recently the most reliable and least volatile source of external monetary inflow that compensated inadequate employment opportunities at home. In recent years, the remittances inflow was almost twice as much as the FDI, but now suffers from Russias economic crisis. Flows are more stable from EU countries. The declining trend of FDI in Georgia continued through 2013 and 2014 in most sectors. A significant increase in investments was observed only in the fields of energy, mining, transport and communications, while the largest decrease occurred in the construction sector. Both exports and imports drastically decreased from the second semester of 2014, after a positive trend in 2013 that took place mainly due to the removal of the Russian trade ban. Georgian authorities state that the drop in exports was caused by several external factors and specifically the difficult political and economic situation in Russia and Ukraine. The two countries imported less wine, alcohol, mineral water and citrus than usual. The deepening of the crisis in Russia also led to a drop in remittances (-23) and tourism, which, coupled with modest foreign investment, led to downward pressure on the Lari exchange rate that further deteriorated in the beginning of 2015. Georgias exports to the EU and Turkey are assessed to be significantly below its potential. The share of exports to the EU remained at an almost stable level of 20, while exports to Turkey have declined over the last decade. Even if exports to the EU are expected to be enhanced by joining the DCFTA, the unsophisticated export basket continues to be a challenge if not diversified to become more competitive. As a consequence of the decrease in exports and increase of imports, the trade balance in 2014 widened by 12 compared to 2013. Only tourism has positioned itself with about 25 growth per year as the most important service export in Georgia. In 2013, it accounted for almost one third of the total service export and 12 of GDP. 12 Sustainability Environmental policy 5 Georgia possesses rich biodiversity, microclimates and cultural landscapes, but is especially sensitive to economic interventions into vulnerable ecosystems. The comprehensive but ineffective legal framework for environmental protection established in the 1990s has undergone excessive deregulation since 2004, in conjunction with economic liberalization. Even with the Green Party joining the Georgian Dream coalition, this trend was not really reversed by the new government (the partys only deputy in parliament left the coalition within a year). Georgias environmental management remains under threat of shortsighted economic interests. Notwithstanding growing protests from the affected population and civil society activists, this has resulted in unsustainable use of natural resources causing in addition to the impact of global climate change serious environmental degradation that is especially devastating in agricultural, mountainous and coastal regions of Georgia, causing an increased number of eco-migrants. Exacerbating the situation of global climate change is the absence of strategies and capacities for sustainable resource management (waste, water, forests, glaciers). Official leasing contracts are, as a rule, short-term and do not provide any incentives for a sustainable use of resources. As a consequence, there is an alarming degree of deforestation in Georgia, which increases the likelihood of soil erosion, landslides and flooding. The construction of several hydroelectric plants, which could have a substantial impact on ecosystems, has been openly resisted by environmental NGOs, such as Green Alternative, and local populations. However, this has not hindered plans, in particular, for construction of the huge Khudoni Dam on the Enguri River. The construction of seven hydroelectric plants in the Kazbegi District and in the Dariali Valley has already begun. The planning and construction of these hydroelectric plants have not been sufficiently transparent they have been conducted without the necessary consultations with ecological experts or open public discussion. The government tends to emphasize the economic advantages of these projects and trivializes possible ecological risks, which became more visible during the reporting period. Another problematic issue is waste disposal and the situation of canal systems, which are the source of numerous infections. The situation of the countrys polluted lakes and rivers also requires urgent action. Disaster risk reduction measures are to be prepared to prevent increased weather - and climate-related hazards. Education policy / RampD 6 Although education policy in Georgia has been marked by increased investment, and the education system has undergone serious reforms, its quality remains a major problem that the government has been trying to address since 2014, in particular with the elaboration of a new Education Strategy. However, since 2006, despite a real increase of nearly 47 in education expenditure, public spending on education has remained around 3 of GDP and therefore lacks serious investment to substantially improve the sector. The poor performance of Georgian pupils in international assessments like PISA and TIMSS points to substantial deficiencies in the education sector that also reflect the deep urban-rural divide and social inequalities. Higher education has been to a great extent converted from a public good into a commodity accessible only for those who can afford it. The problem of quality education is linked to the excessive number of teachers from pre-school to secondary level teaching fewer than the OECD average number of hours, being less qualified for the requirements of modern education than teachers in OECD countries, and, in most cases, underpaid among the lowest paid in the public sector. However, salaries represent almost 75-80 of the budget assigned to education, leaving little space for curriculum improvement, teacher training, grants for research and development or scholarships. The government is currently trying to address the need for improvements in teacher training and remuneration. One success is the de-politicization of schools in comparison to the previous government, under which teacher trade union activists were discriminated against. Overall, self-organization among teachers is low and they are not actively involved in social reform, which has limited the impact of all reform efforts since 2004. In higher education, Georgia joined the Bologna Process in 2005 and successfully eradicated corruption for university entrance exams by implementing a system of national exams. However, this has also generated a demand for fee-based private instruction for young people preparing for these exams. With little internationalization and extremely little money available for research funds, human resources are not adequately renewed so as to contribute to the elaboration of programs and curricula that would be more closely tied to the demands on the labor market. Only very late in 2009, the government realized the importance of reforming the vocational education and training (VET) sector, which, under the new government, received increased funding. However, the contribution of the VET system to overcoming the skills mismatch on the job market is still very limited. As in the whole field of education, reforms in this sector will take a while to create the intended impact. The stigmatized perception of vocational education has also contributed to its negligence. Informal as well as continuous education opportunities are marginalized in the education sector, although Georgia has adopted Lifelong Learning Policies and Strategies. Overall, it seems that quality standards in education can only be achieved with the active involvement of employers and employees representative organizations. Transformation Management I. Level of Difficulty Structural constraints 7 Georgia is still suffering from its deep decline in socioeconomic development after the demise of the Soviet Union. Violent conflicts, economic decline and the loss of the state monopoly on legitimate power led to an immense outflow of capable people during the 1990s. Those societal actors who create change were mainly missing and the overall level of education seriously deteriorated. Thus, the group of political reformers under Saakashvili which came to power in 2004 did not have a broader organized base in society. While being successful in some of their state-building efforts, establishing formal procedures and rules that are accepted and adhered to by the majority of society remain problematic in Georgias socially segregated society, where members of the small group of elites know each other personally. Qualitative changes appeared difficult to achieve in a political culture built around personal loyalty, tactical rapprochements and confrontation instead of a broader consent over long-term strategic development goals. Certainly, the overall limited resources of people, finances and capacities available, and the path dependence on Soviet governance style and overall political culture constantly impede substantial reforms that limit privileged access to resources to the few in favor of increased participation of the broader population organized in different kinds of interest groups, often replacing change with only superficial window dressing. While Saakashvilis reforms succeeded in undermining the overall prevalence of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, the education system, health care, law enforcement and the judiciary, the reliance on informality did not disappear. Informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets, or as doors to building a career. Having an important geopolitical position as a transport and transit corridor between the Black and Caspian Seas, as well as between Russia, Turkey and Iran gives Georgia a special potential role in international affairs of the region. However, the civil war with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was instrumentalized by the Russian leadership to prevent Georgia from joining NATO and associate closely with the European Union. Such a pro-Western orientation is one of the few shared axioms of Georgian society that is supposed to provide more security from its increasingly estranged neighbor Russia. Georgia enjoys fairly good and pragmatic relations with its other immediate neighbors, but its relations with Russia remain one of the biggest security threats overshadowing Georgias development path. Civil society traditions 6 In Georgia, civil society organizations emerged and became active only during the late perestroika period of the Soviet Union as a part of the national movement challenging the Communist Party. During the 1990s, non-governmental organizations managed to survive only thanks to international donor grants, though this fact had mixed impact on their effectiveness and legitimacy among the broader population. Through access to donor funding CSOs provided political activists a niche for their economic survival. Over the years, civil society managed to emerge as an important and influential factor in pushing for constructive and principled change in the political culture, including the moral atmosphere conducive to the peaceful change of power after the parliamentary elections in 2012. On 12 December 2013, the Georgian parliament acknowledged the important role of CSOs in concluding a memorandum with the civil organizations, and established a new tradition of cooperation. Thanks to relatively greater freedom in comparison to most other post-Soviet countries, several capital-based NGOs developed into serious watchdog organizations challenging governments and politicians. However, although increased NGO activity is observable now also in the rural areas, most of these lack a broader membership base. Trade unions represent one of the few exceptions with several thousand members, but their influence is limited. The majority of the impoverished and disenfranchised population is turning towards the Orthodox Church of Georgia for orientation, and to social networks or friends for assistance in need. The emergence of an elitist NGO sector focused on professional consulting and service provision is to a great extent disconnected from the broader society. Those NGOs are still vulnerable to allegations as grant eaters or as politically biased, as happened at the end of 2014. Among the younger generation, students civic activity has become more common. Conflict intensity 5 Persistent social, ethnic and religious cleavages in a country without a tradition of consensus-building through open and transparent dialogue over disputed issues or interests can lead to a confrontation over personalized issues. However, the experience of extreme violence in the early 1990s with paramilitary groups taking over the state and making it a hostage to their particular interests led to caution in escalating conflicts. However, there still are some earlier cases of violence, as mass protests were roughly dispersed by the police in November 2007 and May 2010, the Russo-Georgian War took place in August 2008, and torture became routine in prisons under the Saakashvili regime. Since the change in government in October 2012, there have still been several incidents of smaller violent clashes between the followers of Saakashvili and his contenders from the Georgian Dream, against gay activists, or between the Orthodox majority and the Muslim minority. The state authorities still need to learn how to handle such conflicts in an impartial way, as in the most notorious case of an anti-homophobic rally that was held in Tbilisi on 17 May 2013, the International Day Against Homophobia, during which gay rights activists were violently harassed by thousands of protesters opposing homosexuality who managed to break through a police cordon. II. Management Performance 14 Steering Capability The billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili united the Georgian Dream coalition in its intention to oust President Saakashvili and his United National Movement from power. In its election platform the coalition promised to do a lot of things differently, but any coherent strategy or program was missing. The lack of strategic vision in publicly accessible strategy documents, along with the lack of clearly formulated agendas on the part of almost every political force, is a major drawback. Whenever such documents exist, their function is more closely related to public relations objectives than to an operational plan, and the lack of a realistic implementation agenda remains the main problem even when such documents read well. Even when strategic priorities are set, these may haphazardly change or not be followed in a consistent manner, due to a good deal of voluntarism and unpredictability at the top level of governance. The lack of strategic thinking emerges partly from the legacy of an outdated political tradition, and partly from a weakness in institutional incentives to think and plan strategically. That weakness, in turn, is related to decision-making by a small circle of people in political leadership reluctant to involve independent experts or to consult with the population and civil society. There is also lack of institutionalized channels through which policies can be publicly negotiated, mixed with the tradition of imitating democratic institutions and procedures, which leads to disinterest in the content of any policy debate unless politically relevant, and to widespread populism. Only at an early stage after coming to power, the new government consulted broadly on the revision of the deregulated labor code. Some attempts were made toward inclusive strategy elaboration in the case of less influential ministries like those of sports and youth affairs, or of culture and monument protection. However, it was in the field of culture that the scandal emerged around the destruction of the presumably 5,000 year-old Sakdrisi gold mine that fell victim to a mining companys commercial interests. So far, the new government has not demonstrated any serious will to look for participatory mechanisms aimed at resolving such conflicts. With the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) between Georgia and the EU on 27 June 2014, Georgia has once more underscored its goal of approximation and full integration into the EU. The AA is supposed to provide the master plan for all future reforms. But the question remains as to how implement the European values of democracy, good governance, rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms into everyday practice. Over two decades, three different governments have introduced a number of reforms, modernized financial and public institutions, initiated the harmonization of Georgian legislation with EU regulations, and made considerable progress in the fight against corruption. However, there exists an operational gap in proper implementation of these reforms. Frequently delayed introduction or enactment of important legislative amendments has become one of the negative traits of the Georgian Dream government, which has prevented the formation of a stable and predictable legal environment in the country. At the end of 2014, the deadlines for enacting 10 promised key reforms were delayed for a year. General promises are often offered, instead of dealing with the lack of a common strategic vision by a rather diverse leadership, regarding how to achieve its claimed objectives in a consistent way. Numerous strategic documents were drafted to appeal to international donors, while their implementation proved neither straightforward nor consistent nor successful. The governments promises included eradicating poverty, developing agriculture, resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and joining NATO and the European Union. In general, all of Georgias administrations have struggled to develop strategic plans and to implement existing plans. Obviously, this problem has not disappeared with the new government, whose officials often lack professional expertise, managerial skills and clear leadership from the prime ministers office. Frequent staff rotation, lack of institutional memory and of horizontal coordination among different, related state agencies, as well as profound deficiency in policy formulation and implementation capacities still persist. Policy learning 6 Policy learning has been imperiled for quite some time by the deep divisions in Georgian politics. The relationship between the parties supporting the government and the UNM opposition remains confrontational and counterproductive. Only in rare cases do both political camps succeed in bridging their considerable differences. For example, on March 7, 2013, the parliament adopted a jointly drafted resolution reiterating Georgias commitment to its pro-Western foreign policy course. Overall, parties stand only on very narrow programmatic bases with little interaction and legitimation by their membership. On the positive side, after the 2012 parliamentary elections, cooperation between the new government and civil society organizations improved considerably and the practice of repression and intimidation of the opposition was discarded however, recently, legitimate criticism by leading watchdog NGOs against the governments legal initiatives strengthening surveillance has been rejected by the authorities as politically biased. And another negative example: After the 2012 elections, the Georgian Dream coalition continued the bad practice of the preceding Shevardnadze and Saakashvili administrations with regard to excessively frequent rotation of government positions, disguised by declared intentions of capacity-building and de-politicization of the state institutions. However, developing a stable and meritocratic civil service assisting political office holders in professional decision-making or policy formulation is still to come. 15 Resource Efficiency Efficient use of assets 6 The rotation or replacement of non-performing members continued under the new government, although in some cases the decisions had political or personal overtones, and do not seem to be motivated by any long-term strategy aimed at efficient management of resources. Still, whimsical nominations to high government positions based on personal favoritism common under Saakashvili were replaced for the sake of more rational and efficient management of human resources, although this has not always led to more competent appointments. Civil service reform that should provide security to professionals is still under preparation. So is decentralization of governance and devolution of decision-making and financing authority to the local level. These processes are restricted by a serious deficit of capable human resources in rural areas. At the level of local authorities, a selection process was conducted aimed at replacing political appointments with more professional staff. The most competent candidate has not always been selected, as NGOs monitoring the process discovered. Controversial appointments continued to occur with the new government. Consequently, the minister of energy and vice prime minister is a well-known footballer, but hardly an expert on energy-related issues the prime minister, formerly the managing director of Ivanishvilis Cartu Foundation, became minister of interior, was handpicked for this highest governmental position by the billionaire, who left after one year in office. There are allegations that Ivanishvili is using his personal authority to influence governmental decision-making from behind the scenes. The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information, proactively working on the provision of public information, repeatedly detected that leading state officials self-allocated premiums often greatly exceeded their impressive salaries. Such practices continue to undermine public trust in the governments commitment to sound and consistent reforms. On the positive side, internal control mechanisms, like the State Audit Office, improved performance in identifying misuse or ineffective use of state funds by public employees in office. Only in 2013, the State Audit Office conducted 95 financial and performance audits at different public entities covering the performance period from 2004 to 2013. In-depth audits of some of these institutions had never been attempted before. The findings by the State Audit Office point to essential shortcomings ignored by government or state agencies over the years, due to both mismanagement and a lack of parliamentary oversight. This had resulted in wasteful and undocumented spending of millions of Lari in public funds, which posed serious risks of corruption. Policy coordination 7 Since the parliamentary elections of October 2012, policy coordination has not represented the strongest suite of the diverse members of the Georgian Dream coalition, which was united under the single goal of ousting then-President Saakashvili. They inherited a state apparatus that had developed certain steering capacities, even if previously these were mainly used to implement the decisions of the power circle around Saakashvili. Ministries no longer function as shields for influential circles of economic actors, and policy has gained coherence. Ample space, however, remains even now for improvement with regard to horizontal inter-agency coordination. Vertical interference by the president or prime minister represented the single most important means of ensuring cooperation between different parts of the administration. Ideally, the government should be guided by its revised program, For Strong, Democratic and Unified Georgia, adopted on 26 July 2014. However, while observing disputed cases like the destruction of the ancient Sakdrisi gold mine or the revision and implementation of the Labor Code, it has become clear that, in the presence of strong economic interests, there are no transparent procedures to accommodate opposing interests along balanced policy principles. Anti-corruption policy 7 The Georgian Dream government set out to fight the elite corruption of the previous government, which had set up privileged conditions for individual companies (having political connections) in the market. On 21 March 2014, the parliament of Georgia adopted its On the Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Free Trade and Competition-law, which was developed as a part of anti-monopoly reform to improve the institutional framework of businesses by promoting free competition and developing competitive market as a prerequisite for joining the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. In order to assure its proper implementation, the Competition Agency was established to exercise effective state supervision over a free, fair and competitive environment in the market by preventing the abuse of dominant positions by any economic agent, by supporting small and medium businesses, and by reacting rapidly to violations of the legislation regulating free competition. However, given the past experience of selective justice cases, it remains to be seen how impartially the new agency will operate. The State Audit Office of Georgia (SAOG) is the office of the auditor general and the primary auditing body. Open access to declaration forms and legislation, as well as a hotline number, are provided on the offices website. According to Freedom Houses Nations in Transit Georgia 2013, the SAOG is provided with broad powers to monitor political finances and seize assets or fine any group or organization in violation of Georgias campaign finance regulations. So far, auditing activities mainly covered periods before the new Georgian Dream coalition was in power, and SAOGs impartiality regarding later developments remains to be observed. The Inter-Agency Anti-Corruption Coordination Council represents the other important institution created on the basis of the law on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public Service. Its functions include: coordination of anticorruption activities in the country, updating the anti-corruption action plan and strategy, as well as supervision of their implementation, monitoring accountability towards international organizations, initiation of relevant legislative activities, and drafting recommendations by its nine thematic groups. The council is also following on Georgias implementation of the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Based on an official decree about the necessary measures for the implementation of the action plan of Georgia for the Open Government Partnership, starting from July 2013, government institutions are obliged to make public key operational information. The implementation of a National Action Plan of 2014-2015 (NAP) jointly elaborated by the government, civil society, as well as in consultations with the public will be monitored by the government. Relevant reports will be regularly prepared by the Inter-Agency Anti-Corruption Coordination Council. These institutional mechanisms do not fully prevent cases of nepotism and cronyism, but do provide ground for making such cases public and putting pressure on the government. 16 Consensus-Building Consensus on goals 7 With the signing of the Association Agreement between Georgia and the EU on 27 June 2014, the country committed itself voluntarily to conducting serious reforms in further aligning itself with EU standards. The Association Agreement was essentially prepared under the UNM government and finalized by the Georgian Dream coalition. Among the political elites, there is a broad consensus on Western integration, although, while UNM was more in accord with neoliberal approaches favored by Republican administrations in the U. S. Georgian Dream seems to prefer the approaches prevalent in the EU. Another dividing line between the two political forces is policy towards Russia, in which case the UNM accuses Georgian Dream of a pro-Russian stance and too conciliatory an approach in addressing Georgias separatist conflicts. Beyond the basics, there is likewise little unity within the ruling coalition. After the arrest of top staff members from the Ministry of Defense for corruption, Minister Irakli Alasania, leader of the Free Democrats Party, was sacked by the Prime Minister for his public criticism of this action. As a consequence, the Free Democrats Party quit the coalition and went into opposition, while some members of the party left the government and the majority faction in the parliament, accusing Georgian Dream of deviation from a consistent pro-Western policy. Parliament Speaker, Davit Usupashvili, denounced, on behalf of his Republican Party, another member of the ruling coalition, the allegations about Georgias Euro-Atlantic course being under threat as groundless, and announced that his party will not leave the coalition. However, Republicans frequently criticize decisions supported by the majority of the Georgian Dream, and are expected to further dissent in the future. This, once again, demonstrates that there is no detailed strategic and value-based vision around which the coalition can be united. Instead, it is kept together by political circumstances and the fact of being in power.16.1While there is general agreement regarding the basic principles of the market economy, there is hardly any consensus on common policy goals within the rather diverse coalition of political parties that make Georgian Dream. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinions are more often voiced with regards to political issues, and rarely relate to strategic decisions in the economic sphere promoted by the government the parliament more often simply rubber-stamping government initiatives. Anti-democratic actors 7 Although the National Movement under former President Saakashvili prioritized state-building over democratization, it acknowledged its defeat in the parliamentary elections of October 2012. The Georgian Dream coalition set itself the task of depoliticizing state institutions. The legacy of human rights violations by the previous government created a segment in society that demands revenge or justice against UNM members previously in power. The Alliance of Patriots (AOP) managed to unite some such people. AOP was also in favor of delaying signing of the AA with the EU, and considers Georgias NATO aspirations fruitless. It came in fourth in last years local elections by garnering just under 5 of the vote. Although this group cannot be called explicitly anti-democratic, it argues that the new government did not take sufficient legal measures against the alleged UNM perpetrators, in contrast with the position promoted by the majority of Georgias Western partners. Other anti-democratic actors resemble political entrepreneurs, acting on behalf of some bigger business interests. Another influential factor is the rather conservative Orthodox Church of Georgia, one of Georgias least transparent institutions, but with very high public trust rates mainly due to public respect of the person of Patriarch Ilia II. As disappointment grows because living conditions for the population are not improving, more support for antidemocratic forces can be expected. According to an IRI survey from February 2015, if people had to choose, only 38 opted for a democratic system of government while 50 wanted a prosperous economy. However, support for joining the EU (85) and NATO (78) remains high. Cleavage / conflict management 6 The capabilities of political elites related to conflict management remain to a great extent underdeveloped. No substantial progress has been achieved with regard to reconciliation with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, widely perceived as instruments of Russian geopolitical manipulation. The initial progress achieved in civic integration of ethnic and religious minority groups is hindered by insufficient enforcement of essential constitutional rights for some religious and sexual minorities. The polarization between Georgian Dream and United National Movement continues. There is an insufficient tradition and culture of dialogue and negotiation, and reform-oriented forces have not been able to institutionalize effective conflict-resolution and mitigation mechanisms. Institutionalized forms of consent-building and legitimizing procedures are still more the exception than the rule, also because the majority of the population, due to dire socioeconomic conditions, are reluctant to participate in the political field as active citizens, or are prone to become victims of populist rhetoric, which often exploits existing tensions and conflicts. Civil society participation 6 After Saakashvilis defeat in the parliamentary elections, the once-vibrant NGO sector returned as an active interlocutor with the government in several important civil rights reform fields. Cooperation between the new government and civil society organizations on issues such as the new labor law, the state budget or local administration reform has become more productive. These NGOs continued to be an important pool for the recruitment of government personnel, as well as a field of activity for former politicians creating new NGOs critical of the current government. The new authorities responded to concerns raised by some leading watchdog organizations with regard to correcting authoritarian trends in constitutional amendments, bureaucratic harassment of independent media outlets and businesses, and human rights violations. NGOs have participated in the policy process when their capabilities and know-how were needed. The parliament even concluded a memorandum of understanding, acknowledging the special role of civil society organizations in the legislative process and in monitoring the proper implementation of the laws. However, due to the fact that the NGOs do not sufficiently represent broader parts of society, and often follow an agenda not aligned with the needs of the population, CSOs do not enjoy much trust in society (e. g. in comparison with the church, army or patrol police, or recently, the media). Under the new government, leading NGOs fulfill some control functions normally exercised by political opposition. Trade unions and professional associations have developed slowly, being concentrated mainly in the capital and bigger urban centers. In rural and mountainous areas, the few existing NGOs are still very weak and have only very limited influence on local affairs. However, there have also been some threats voiced against NGOs. In May 2014, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili slammed NGOs united in the This Affects You coalition, a group campaigning against the governments unfettered access to telecom operators networks, saying that they damage Georgias international reputation and undermine the countrys security. Previously, in a joint statement on 2 February 2014, 46 non-governmental organizations condemned ex-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvilis remarks in which he stated that he is looking into the activities of several civil society activists considered to be threatening. Possibilities for reconciliation with the separatist Abkhazian authorities deteriorated further with Abkhazias conclusion of a treaty of alliance and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation in December 2014. A similar treaty was signed on 18 March 2015 between Russia and South Ossetias de facto authorities. These acts to some extent are seen as a Russian reaction to the conclusion by Georgia of the Association Agreement with the EU. State Minister of Reconciliation and Civic Equity Paata Zakareishvili has very little to offer the secessionist entities other than to become more self-reflective on the origins of the conflicts and Tbilisis mistakes. There are only few government-led confidence building measures toward Abkhazians and South Ossetians, focused mainly on the provision of medical aid. The status neutral personal travel documents offered by Tbilisi were rejected by both Abkhazians and Ossetians, since they had to be issued by Georgian authorities. The many cases of selective justice, arrests of political opponents and businessmen, or extortions from small - and medium-scale enterprises by state officials during the Saakashvili administration have created a deep split in society. After the new government took office, demands proliferated for re-establishing justice, which would include prosecuting previous government officials for having misused their position for their own advantages or political interest. At the same time, international pressure on the new government to not practice selective revenge justice is also very high. As many persons accused of misdeeds remain in office, there is a widespread conviction that a thorough reappraisal of the past would require more than merely juridical measures. However, suggestions that truth and reconciliation commissions be composed of prominent members of civil society have not been brought to realization. The ongoing revision of the National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration could offer still another approach towards a broader reconciliation process in Georgia. 17 International Cooperation Effective use of support 7 As in previous years, Georgia has continued to receive massive financial aid from multilateral and bilateral donors with the bulk of financial assistance spent on infrastructure projects like the rehabilitation of roads, water pipelines, irrigation systems and the electricity sector, as well as on credits to small and medium-sized enterprises. While some of these projects were considered successful, donor-driven efforts to create a professional civil service are still under way. Critics claim that, under the Saakashvili administration, aid money was not always spent in ways that helped strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Ownership of cooperation programs was varying in accordance to political convictions, which was sometimes expressed in drastic policy shifts. Donor coordination remained weak. The new government should coordinate international assistance according to its development strategy Georgia 2020, which lacks clearly formulated indicators. The Association Agreement concluded with the EU is accompanied by the Association Agenda, which for the first years will steer the implementation of Georgias commitments towards EU principles and standards. The agenda provides for an explicitly formulated long-term development strategy and requires it to be consistently implemented. One of the major donors is the European Union, supporting Georgias approximation process under its European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020 with 610-746 million for reforms of public administration, agriculture and rural development and justice, while providing complementary support for capacity development and civil society. The other important donor is the U. S. government, whose focus is on building democracy, promoting regional stability, and fostering economic growth and health services. In the next four years, USAID aims to promote attitudes and values that encourage citizens to be responsible and accountable for their country. USAIDs four long-term objectives are economic growth, energy sector reform, democracy and governance, and social and health services development. The fact that, prior to the October 2012 change of government, important administrative decisions were usually taken by a small circle of insiders with no inclusion of the persons affected by these decisions was felt to be a major problem that seriously compromised the governments credibility as well as its commitment to implementing serious reforms and establishing transparent and democratic practices of governance. The new Georgian authorities stopped criticizing donor organizations for being too bureaucratic, and the overall balance of the cooperation between Georgia and the international donor community remains good. The commitment to achieving sustainable results through cooperation even increased, e. g. in the framework of the Association Agreement. Georgian society supports the course of orienting the country toward the integration into European Union and NATO structures. A vast majority of respondents consider EU support to be very important for Georgia, and 80 favor EU membership. However, aspirations for EU and NATO membership are often seen unrealistically as the solution for all social and economic problems of the country. Unrealistic expectations seem to lie in the tradition of patrimonial relationship with leading figures, when loyalty is provided on the condition of delivery of material improvements. Thus, Mikheil Saakashvili, as well as billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, can be blamed for having raised such unrealistic expectations in the population in order to legitimize their aspirations for power. However, they cannot create employment, but only the necessary environment. Only business can create jobs, which require entrepreneurial skills and affordable loans for start-ups. Regional cooperation 8 Due to past experiences of threat perception and conflict, Georgian foreign policy has been focused primarily on the closely interconnected issues of handling strained relations with Russia and gaining admission to NATO. However, admission to NATO is no longer a realistic short-term goal and has been moved somewhat to the periphery of the foreign policy agenda since the 2008 war. Regional cooperation, which is also fostered in the framework of the EU Neighborhood Policy, has continued to be of some importance. Relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia are basically good and not much influenced by conflicts. The idea of becoming a transportation and energy corridor in the region is still relevant, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (Turkey) railway is expected to be finished by the second half of 2015. The railway is being built to create an energy corridor by rail for cargo mainly from Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. In addition to that, current cargo traffic from Turkey to CIS countries may shift to this new route. The new government attempted to improve its relations with Russia and regained access to the Russian market for Georgian products, such as wine and mineral water, in 2013. The Georgian prime ministers special envoy Zurab Abashidze conducts talks with Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gregory Karasyn on the condition that official recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states by Russia is excluded from the dialogue. However, lately, relations between the Georgian Dream government and Russia have become more strained due to the agreements concluded by Moscow with Sukhum(i) and Tskhinval(i), against the background of the undeclared hybrid war in Ukraine. The visa-free regime for Russian citizens is still in force, but traveling to Russia remains difficult and cumbersome for Georgian citizens, as visa requirements are strict. Strategic Outlook During the 24 years of Georgias transformation process, changes in power have been provoked variously by putsches, demonstrations or impeachments. Besides his increasingly authoritarian leadership style, former President Saakashvili also set a positive precedent in acknowledging defeat in parliamentary elections, which may contribute to the consolidation of democratic institutions in Georgia. Georgia needs to take further steps toward the development of a democratic system of horizontal accountability, establishing a set of checks and balances through institutions of comparable strength, which continuously oversee each other. The Georgian judiciary and parliament have a particularly important role to play in the development of such a system. The parliament of Georgia needs to pay closer attention to the audit findings of the State Audit Office and assume a more responsible oversight role. The extent to which it succeeds in doing this will determine whether Georgia can finally establish a working and transparent system of checks and balances, promote good governance, limit the scope for abuse of power, and make further progress in the fight against corruption. Overall, the Georgian state should strive to involve civil society and business more systematically and ensure that they are properly involved in the law-making process. Such participation could promote dialogue at the political level in order to ensure a proper implementation of legislation and coordination among relevant authorities. Civil society organizations themselves should improve their limited outreach toward the broader population. The government needs to develop and explicitly formulate a strategic vision with clear policies to increase and diversify the countrys industrial base with a focus on small and medium enterprises, putting into due use the countrys main capital human resources and cultural heritage. This could help commercial banks better assess the future direction of development and increase private lending, as well as sustainable employment. However, this requires a serious effort and increased investment in quality education, especially in entrepreneurial skills and the populations financial literacy. A well-designed policy mix, aimed at increasing financial literacy and informational transparency, could significantly improve the growth prospects for the Georgian economy. To overcome Georgias weak economy the DCFTA between Georgia and the EU is a challenge and an opportunity at the same time. It is a vital trade instrument for building long-term economic relationships. In order for DCFTA to fulfill its potential, Georgia will need the EUs increased support with a view to facilitating legal approximation and its effective implementation. Georgia should prioritize those spheres and degrees of approximation which are most relevant from a development point of view. When prioritizing harmonization, the EU should tailor its recommendations to Georgias needs and socioeconomic situation, e. g. public demand for employment and mitigating the negative effects of approximation. Besides economic development, Georgia should develop effective implementation mechanisms also for reforms in improving the justice sector, to preventing it from being subject to accusations of political bias. To make effective use of international assistance, the government should establish a functioning donor coordination mechanism in line with its Georgia 2020 development strategy. The broad approval rate for EU approximation and integration into Western structures provides the basis for serious reforms of the state and society, which needs to accept that pluralism does not represent a threat to national identity. On the contrary, pluralism may strengthen the moral basis that allows for resolving conflicting interests in an institutionalized, inclusive and transparent way. This possibly represents the biggest challenge of qualitative change for the country. Georgia Country Report
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